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Suppressing the Great Awakening:
Alexander Garden’s Use of Anti-Popery Against George
Whitefield
John P. Barrington
Compared with the inhabitants of other mainland British colonies, South Caro-linians—even members of the white elite—produced relatively few statements
of ideology or extensive discussions of current affairs. Consequently, reconstructing
the worldview of South Carolinians in the early-eighteenth century can be a chal-
lenge. Fortunately, the normal reticence of South Carolinians was broken by
Alexander Garden, head of the Church of England in the colony, when he attacked
George Whitefield during the Great Awakening. Garden delivered several sermons
and published numerous tracts against the evangelist between 1740 and 1742. His
works constitute the first extensive, published, ideological discourse by a resident
South Carolinian. This discourse, which touches on more than just religious mat-
ters, delineates the framework of values and phobias through which Garden and his
readers interpreted the world around them. Surprisingly, Garden’s works have at-
tracted little attention. Historians who have mentioned them at all have generally
failed to analyze their content.1 Yet, on close investigation, Garden’s attacks on
Whitefield reveal themselves as complex, clever, and surprising - especially in their
insistence that Whitefield was an agent of the Roman Catholic Church.
Alexander Garden was born in 1685 in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, and earned
his M.A. at the University of Aberdeen in 1711. After holding a curacy in a London
parish, he migrated to Charleston in 1720, where he ended up spending the bulk of
his adult life.2 In his new home, he took up a post as curate of St. Philip’s, soon rising
to be rector. The Bishop of London, whose diocese included all of British America,
began to treat Garden as his unofficial agent from 1723, and six years later pro-
moted Garden to the official position of commissary, or episcopal representative.3
Garden settled in thoroughly to life in Charleston. He worked well with the vestry of
St. Philip’s and was also influential with the colony’s Assembly. He married and sired
five children in South Carolina, and he also accumulated considerable property.
When he retired from his duties as commissary and as parish priest, he made his
final home in the colony, where he died in 1756.4 Given his successful and promi-
nent role among the influential leaders of South Carolina, Garden’s publications
can provide us with a valuable perspective on how elite, white South Carolinians saw
their colony’s position in the world during the years around 1740.
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At the start of the public debate between Garden and Whitefield, the commis-
sary presided over a Church of England that counted about 45 percent of South
Carolina’s white population among its members. The rest of the colony’s whites be-
longed to one of the colony’s Dissenting sects, the most numerous of which were the
Huguenots, Congregationalists, and Baptists.5 The Church of England was legally
established, and it therefore received financial support from South Carolina’s gov-
ernment. Dissenters were not only tolerated, as they were in England, but they also
enjoyed additional rights of voting and holding public office, unlike their counter-
parts in the mother country. This distribution of privilege and power between the
Church of England and the Dissenters had been reached only after a protracted
political controversy that had embroiled the colony during the first two decades of
the eighteenth century.6 Any aggressive or tactless action by either religious group
could easily re-ignite old passions.
Even within Garden’s Church of England, there were varying theological stand-
points. The majority of the clergy inclined, to a greater or lesser degree, to an
Arminian position: these clerics believed that man, by freely choosing to obey the
moral precepts of Scripture and the church, and by engaging in formal worship
according to the church’s liturgy, could fulfill God’s conditions for salvation. By con-
trast, about one-third of the established church’s clergy in South Carolina were Cal-
vinists, who believed that man’s fate in the afterlife was predestined and that no
decision or action on earth could alter that fate. Among this Calvinist group were
former Dissenters, especially French Huguenots, who had accepted the authority of
the Church of England.7 In addition to these doctrinal distinctions, another charac-
teristic of the established church in South Carolina was that many of the clergy were
funded by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G.), a missionary orga-
nization based in England, but with its chief focus on the American colonies. The
S.P.G. had been founded with the twin goals of combating Quaker and Catholic
influence in America and cooperating with non-Quaker Dissenters. Although some
members of the S.P.G. did not always adhere to the second of these original goals,
many did, believing that the Protestant cause would only be weakened by strife be-
tween members of different denominations.8 Garden thus presided over a church
that contained many members who were either Calvinists themselves, or who were
dedicated to the principle of cooperation with Calvinist Dissenters.
Whitefield threatened to disrupt this delicate balance between Dissenters and
Anglicans, and between Calvinists and non-Calvinists within the Church of England.
In his sermons, both oral and printed, and in his published Journal, the evangelist
made a number of attacks on the Anglican clergy. One such attack charged that the
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clergy led worldly lives and that they were too ready to condone worldliness in their
congregations.9 A serious example of this worldliness was the clergy’s readiness to
condone the cruelty of slave owners towards their slaves while doing nothing to con-
vert those slaves to Christianity.10 Whitefield also claimed that most of the clergy
were preaching a doctrine of “works,” ie. the idea that man could earn salvation
through his own virtuous actions. Such a doctrine, said Whitefield, was clearly in
disagreement with the Articles of the Church of England, which laid down Calvinist
principles with regard to man’s salvation.11 Whitefield attacked the Anglican clergy
not only for preaching false ideas about salvation but also for recommending that
their congregations read Arminian publications, such as Richard Allestree’s Whole
Duty of Man and the sermons of John Tillotson. These works, lamented Whitefield,
were “Anti-Christian Compositions” that taught nothing better than “Compliance
with the vilest Practices of the Idolatrous Heathens.”12
Whitefield’s attacks presented Garden with a serious challenge. According to
one historian, William Kenney, the evangelist placed Garden in an impossible situa-
tion: if the commissary ignored Whitefield, the authority of the Church of England
would be compromised, and the Dissenters of South Carolina would be emboldened
to renew their attack on its privileges. On the other hand, by choosing to take bold
action against Whitefield, Kenney argues, Garden appeared as a tyrant, and he alien-
ated himself and the Anglican hierarchy from the Calvinist mainstream in South
Carolina and elsewhere in the colonies. In this situation, Garden could not win. The
commissary’s dilemma, concludes this scholar, resulted from a larger fact of life in
the colonies: established churches could not prosper in the egalitarian and religiously
diverse conditions that prevailed in America.13
Kenney’s interpretation of the Garden-Whitefield confrontation is mistaken
on a number of counts: first, he characterizes the relationship between the estab-
lished church and the Dissenters as crudely confrontational, whereas in fact it was
more complex; second, he fails to appreciate the subtlety of Garden’s counterattack
against Whitefield contained in Garden’s published critiques of the evangelist’s ac-
tivities; and finally, Kenney does not account for the fact that Whitefield’s following,
which was robust in early 1740, shrank to almost nothing a year later. Indeed, Charles-
ton became the only example of a major colonial city where the evangelist failed to
make permanent headway.14
The following analysis of Garden’s actions and writings attempts to demon-
strate that Garden handled Whitefield in a politically astute fashion, and that the com-
missary successfully deflected the challenge posed by the evangelist. The key element
in Garden’s strategy was his determination to avoid identifying the evangelist with
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Calvinism, so that any attack on Whitefield also became an attack on the theological
views of a majority of white South Carolinians. Garden did not want to drive the
significant number of Calvinists in the Church of England out of the church, nor did
he want to antagonize Dissenters, whose political rights gave them the potential to
weaken the Anglican establishment’s privileges in the colony.15
Garden’s counter-attack against Whitefield took two forms. As commissary,
Garden had the power to convene an ecclesiastical court to discipline errant Church
of England clergy. Accordingly, Garden convened the court on 15 July 1740. The
charges brought against Whitefield avoided any mention of the evangelist’s doc-
trine. On 18 July, the court found Whitefield guilty of failing to use an approved
form of worship in his religious meetings and of preaching outside his parish with-
out a license. The evangelist was suspended from preaching, but the implementa-
tion of the sentence was delayed for a year since Whitefield demanded the right to
appeal to the Bishop of London. When Whitefield failed to appeal the court’s sen-
tence in the allotted time, he was duly suspended, on 19 July 1741.16 By that date, the
evangelist had long left the colony. The court’s sentence, however, did succeed in
making the point to all clergy and laity who respected the principle of authority in
the Church of England that Whitefield did not have the backing of the Anglican
hierarchy.
Garden’s second course of action against Whitefield was to preach from the
pulpit of St. Philip’s, Charleston. Between 1740 and 1742 Garden published three of
these sermons along with two series of letters attacking the evangelist. Since Garden
repeated many of the same themes in all his works against Whitefield, it is easier to
approach Garden’s publications on a thematic basis, rather than work by work, to
see how each of his themes was fashioned to appeal to a wide spectrum of Protestant
readers. One of Garden’s major tasks was to refute Whitefield’s claim that the
Arminian doctrines held by Garden and by a majority of the Church of England
clergy in the colony constituted a doctrine of “works,” ie. a belief that man could
earn salvation through his own merit without the need for Christ’s sacrifice or God’s
grace. Garden defended his views by stressing that man’s good actions only fulfilled
a limited set of conditions laid down by God for salvation after God had forgiven the
bulk of man’s sins: man had to take a few small steps of his own, but he largely
depended on God’s mercy for salvation. Such a theology, Garden argued, was en-
tirely consistent with the Articles of the Church of England, and Whitefield slan-
dered the clergy by claiming that they had departed from the teachings of that
church.17
Having defended his own position, Garden was unwilling to leave Whitefield
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looking like a champion of Calvinism. Garden’s attack on the evangelist therefore
included denunciations of Whitefield’s own inconsistency on the question of how
far men could influence their own salvation. According to the commissary, Whitefield
himself sometimes preached an essentially Arminian doctrine.18 In fact, one of the
most distinctive features of the evangelist’s ministry, the open-air meetings in which
Whitefield preached to thousands, even tens of thousands, of listeners, relied on the
notion that man could take action towards winning his own salvation. Satirically,
Garden asked Whitefield whether urging the crowds who flocked to hear him to
“fast, weep, howl, sing, read Scripture, [and] hear Sermons” was not urging them to
do good works?19 This point was a telling one. The antics of those who came to hear
Whitefield were well-known on both sides of the Atlantic. Whitefield publicized them
in his Journal, while the authorities of the Church of England attacked them as spiri-
tually meaningless bouts of hysteria.20 Garden thus managed to turn the hallmark of
the evangelist’s ministry into evidence of the evangelist’s inconsistency and hypoc-
risy: Whitefield, by urging the public to come in droves to hear him and be saved,
was preaching a doctrine of “works.” Not only did this practice disqualify him from
calling himself a Calvinist it also made his denunciations of Arminians in the Church
of England look dishonest.
Equally dishonest, according to Garden, were Whitefield’s criticisms of the
Anglican clergy’s failure to bring Christianity to the African slaves. In the summer of
1740, the evangelist published his Letter to the Inhabitants of Maryland, Virginia, North-
and South-Carolina, in which he attacked slave owners for mistreating their slaves and
for failing to Christianize them. In this document, Whitefield warned that God will
punish these slave-owning societies, possibly by stirring up a slave revolt.21 Garden
attacked this tract of Whitefield’s as dishonest and disruptive. The commissary stressed
that the evangelist’s views, though poorly expressed, were essentially in agreement
with those of the Church of England. Garden agreed with Whitefield that owners
did wrong when they treated their slaves cruelly and that more efforts should indeed
be made to convert the slaves. The commissary pointed out that his superior, the
Bishop of London, had recently made the same points in his Second Pastoral Letter, to
which Whitefield’s tract added no substantive arguments. Whitefield’s only real pur-
pose seemed to be to stir up trouble by slandering all slave owners as monsters, by
falsely accusing all Church of England clergy of being unconcerned with the slaves’
salvation, and by publicly discussing a major slave uprising in a manner that might
actually provoke one.22
Whitefield’s complaints about the Anglican clergy’s theology and its failure to
evangelize made even less sense, Garden argued, given the fact that Whitefield insisted
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on remaining a member of the established church. If Whitefield was truly unhappy
with what was being taught and done in the Church of England, if he truly felt, as he
said he did, that the Anglican clergy was guilty of “leading the People to the Gates of
Hell,” then he should simply leave the church and become a Dissenter. The fact that
Whitefield picked groundless quarrels with his fellow clergymen and then insisted
on remaining in a church he professed to despise suggested underhand purposes. If
Whitefield was neither consistently Arminian nor Calvinist, if he was unhappy with
the Church of England and yet not a member of any Dissenting denomination, what
did the evangelist believe? What was his religious affiliation?23
Garden answered these questions by labeling Whitefield an “enthusiast” and
by demonstrating that this “enthusiasm” linked him, in terms of both his theology
and his disruptive evangelizing methods, to the Roman Catholic Church. Through-
out his polemics, Garden of course used the term “enthusiasm” in its eighteenth-
century sense, defining it as:
Forsaking the ordinary Ways and Means of attaining the knowl-
edge of our Religious Duty, viz. Natural Reason and the written
Word of God; and substituting in their Place our own Conceits of
immediate Revelations,  . . . [springing from] certain Impulses,
Motions, or Impressions of the Holy Spirit on our Minds, without
any rational objective Evidence, or clear and efficient Proof.”24
Such “enthusiasm,” claimed Garden, was difficult to combat, because when enthusi-
asts were accused of beliefs that were contrary to Scripture and reason, they simply
claimed that the unregenerate were unable to “see and judge of spiritual Things,”
and that only those in whom the Spirit dwelt could perceive the Spirit’s truth. How
could anyone argue against a man who claimed to be “a special Messenger sent forth
from God, and therefore not bound to give Proofs and Reasons of his Message”?
“Sure[ly],” exclaimed Garden, this was “a compendious Method to stop every Mouth;
[to] shut out all the Powers of Argument and Reason . . . !”25
Enthusiasm not only opened the door to error, but also to dangerous antisocial and
immoral behavior. After all, once a person began to believe that he was divinely
inspired and began to ignore reason, where would his delusions end? Ultimately,
there could be “No Reveries so monstrous or absurd, which shall not be deemed
Divine Impulses or Inspirations! No Practices so wicked or immoral, which shall not
be justified as Fruits or Effects of these [impulses]! If the wicked Fancy, Conceit, or
Inclination be, to commit Murder, Adultery, or Incest, etc., it is [claimed to be] the
Impulse of the Spirit, the Command of God, and it shall be committed.”26
Garden represented this “enthusiasm” as typical of many religious extremists,
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suggesting parallels between Whitefield and sectarians like “the Oliverians, Ranters,
Quakers, French Prophets,” and with religious leaders like “Mahomet, Muncer, Fox,
Nailor, and Muggleton.”27 Yet while Garden cast his net broadly to find insulting
comparisons for Whitefield, no comparison appeared more frequently or was fleshed
out in greater detail than Garden’s likening of the evangelist’s beliefs to Roman
Catholicism. More importantly, while Garden never claimed that Whitefield was ac-
tually a Quaker or a Muslim, Garden did argue that Whitefield might be an active
member of the Catholic Church.
Garden drew on a well-developed tradition in the eighteenth-century Church
of England when he equated Catholics and “enthusiasts” as men who denied reason
and scripture and who relied on unrestrained internal impulses.28 A trait of
Whitefield’s that was both “enthusiastic” and “popish” was his tendency to preach in
an authoritarian rather than a rational manner, a practice typical of those who be-
lieved themselves to possess infallible guidance. Garden warned his readers about
Whitefield and his fellow Methodists, who approached the masses by:
cramming [doctrine] down their Throats with Anathema’s, Hell
and Damnation at the End of them, on all that will not implicitely
receive them; in this Case, I say, be we sure, that such are either
Men of enthusiastick Heads, or Emissaries of Rome.29
More specifically, Garden argued that Whitefield’s method of debate was remi-
niscent of Jesuit techniques:
It is a Maxim, I am told, among the Jesuits in Controversy, never
to regard the Arguments or Objections of an Adversary; but to
neglect them, and always return to their own Assertion, as if noth-
ing had been offered against it. A Maxim worthy indeed of that
singular Order! Do you not also pursue this Trick of theirs in your
Polemicks? Did you learn it of them? Or is it the Fruit of your own
Genius?30
Indeed, the apparent lack of consistency in Whitefield’s teachings, which Gar-
den pointed out time and time again, was typical of “popery”:
Beware, my Brethren, this is an arrant Jumble of Contradiction
and Confusion, either calculated by a Romish EMISSARY, to dis-
tract and confound weak Minds; or the Produce of a warm,
fanatick, Enthusiastick Brain.31
Catholic emissaries had a deep purpose for preaching such inconsistent and
confusing doctrines:
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We know Rome has her Seed and Harvest Missionaries. Her
Seedmen sow INFIDELITY and ENTHUSIASM, to distress and
unsettle weak Minds, often to Distraction; and then appear the
Harvest Men; to heal their Wounds, and gather them home into
the Bosom of their Mother, from whom they had gone astray.32
Garden made these charges more than once, lamenting that so many, by fol-
lowing Whitefield, were:
throwing themselves into the Arms of a strong Delusion!—a Har-
vest indeed for Romish Missionaries! For who knows not, that this
[practice], of laying aside Reason, is a first Doctrine of Popery,
the main Foundation of the terrible Fabrick of Rome!33
Thus, Whitefield’s “enthusiasm” held the key to categorizing the evangelist’s
beliefs and ultimate religious affiliation: the evangelist, wittingly or unwittingly, was
acting according to the purposes of Rome.
Garden himself was not immune from being accused of “popery.” As the local
head of an established church, and especially as the convener of an ecclesiastical
court that brought Whitefield to trial, Garden was very vulnerable to such accusa-
tions. On occasion, Whitefield tried to exploit this vulnerability. In his Journal,
Whitefield compared Garden’s summons to the ecclesiastical court to a “Pope’s Bull.”
The evangelist also played with Garden’s name to evoke images of Stephen Gardiner,
the persecuting bishop of Mary Tudor’s reign, who was known to eighteenth-cen-
tury colonists from the widely-read works of John Foxe, the sixteenth-century
martyrologist.34 Yet Garden proved himself to be more than a match for Whitefield
when it came to employing anti-Catholic stereotypes to tarnish his opponent. Garden’s
polemics were larded with cleverly manipulated images that turned Whitefield’s ac-
cusations against him into further grounds for suspecting the evangelist of “popery.”
In his Third Letter, Garden recalled that Whitefield had boasted in his Journal
that evangelical preaching against unregenerate ministers had “kindled a Fire which
all the Devils in Hell shall not be able to Extinguish!” To this claim, Garden retorted:
Alas, (Sir) the Fire you have kindled is that of Slander and Defama-
tion. A Fire! which no Devil in Hell, no nor no Jesuit nor Deist on
Earth, will ever go about to Extinguish; but fagot and foment it with
all their Might, as [all] too effectually serving their Interests. . . . 35
In this passage, Garden skillfully took Whitefield’s own metaphor of a fire and
turned it against the evangelist by invoking images of Catholics stoking the fires of
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persecution, images that were familiar to British Americans from works like Foxe’s
Acts and Monuments.36 It is true that here Garden mentioned Deists as well as Jesuits
as enemies who might make use of Whitefield’s slanders against the Church of En-
gland, but the image of adding fagots to a fire would have made the anti-Catholic
element of this passage paramount to readers: Deists were thought of more as de-
tached intellectuals than as active persecutors.
Garden built on the anti-Catholic imagery of this passage as he proceeded
with his attack. Clearly the commissary assumed that his talk of Jesuits stoking a
bonfire would bring the idea of persecution into his readers’ minds, for after the
passage quoted above, in what to us but not to an eighteenth-century reader would
seem to be something of a non sequitur, he immediately continued his denunciation
of Whitefield as follows:
You and your Brethren cry out Persecution! ‘Tis true, Persecu-
tion there is in the Case; but are you not the Persecutors? Is it not
you that falsely accuse the Brethren; disturb the Peace of the
Church; and trample on her Laws and Canons (though solemnly
engaged to obey them), and despise her Authority? But still Per-
secution you cry out; for Want of it you mean; for Ours is no per-
secuting Country for Religion; every Man may enjoy his own Way
in Peace and Safety. . . .
Garden then suggested that Whitefield and his associates might like to go to
Spain, Portugal, or to the Native Americans if they so greatly desired to be perse-
cuted.37 In this passage, Garden not only evoked the idea of Whitefield as an oath
breaker, another anti-Catholic stereotype common in the eighteenth-century British
Empire, but also suggested a hidden motive behind Whitefield’s claim that the au-
thorities, including Garden, were persecuting him. By deriding the evangelist’s claim
of persecution and suggesting that the evangelist go outside the British Empire to
find out what persecution really was, Garden might well have struck a patriotic nerve
in his readers. Given the war that was in progress between Britain and Spain, and
given the widespread pride in the colonies about British liberty, Whitefield’s attempt
to equate the behavior of the Church of England with that of the Catholic Church in
Spain could only seem to be in poor taste and nonsensical, trivializing the ideologi-
cal gulf that separated the British Empire from its Catholic foes. Taken as a whole,
this section of the Third Letter suggested that Whitefield, by attempting to equate
Garden with “popish” tyrants, was only trying to sow dissension in the Church of
England. Since that dissension would benefit Catholic schemes, Whitefield’s cry of
persecution actually aligned him with the Church of Rome.
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While Garden attacked Whitefield on many grounds, the heart of his attack
was his claim that the evangelist was a witting or unwitting agent of the Catholic
Church. The importance of the charges of “popery” lay not just in their frequent
appearance but in the way that Whitefield’s “popish” behavior and affiliations served
to explain so many aspects of the evangelist’s activities. The notion of Whitefield as
an emissary of Rome bound all Garden’s other charges into a coherent whole. It was
“popish” to sow dissension among members of the Church of England, “popish” to
discourage rational debate and to encourage reliance on supposedly infallible,
“enthusiastick” impulses, and, conceivably, it was “popish” to invite slave uprisings
through tactless and pointless remarks. Thus the idea of Whitefield as a Catholic
agent was at the logical center of Garden’s portrait of the evangelist.
These extraordinary charges seem too far-fetched to take seriously today. Their
prominence in Garden’s attack, however, should not be surprising. The pervasive im-
portance of anti-Catholicism in the eighteenth-century British Empire has been dem-
onstrated by a number of recent scholars, who argue that anti-popery was a major
source of identity for Britons and British Americans up until the time of the American
Revolution.38 In the context of these cultural prejudices and philosophical assump-
tions, Garden’s charges would have made sense to his auditors and readers. Therefore
these accusations, however ridiculous they might seem to us, should not be passed over
as they have been in previous discussions of the Great Awakening in South Carolina.
There is no doubt about the prominence of the theme of Whitefield as “pa-
pist” in Garden’s published writings. A more difficult question to answer is: what
impact did these accusations of “popery” have on the readers of these texts? The
answer to this question may lie in Whitefield’s sudden loss of reputation in the sec-
ond half of 1740. In the middle of that year, the evangelist’s popularity was at its
peak, according to both his own and Garden’s accounts, but by early 1741, when he
was arrested for libel and released on bail, the evangilist was in disgrace. Lacking
confidence in the outcome of his trial, Whitefield fled the colony before his court
date.39 What caused this sudden reversal of fortune?
Harvey Jackson has offered an explanation of Whitefield’s fall that focuses on
white South Carolinians’ racial fears. Jackson argues that Whitefield’s close association
with Hugh Bryan, a planter who founded a school for teaching Christianity to slaves,
tarnished the evangelist’s reputation in the eyes of a broad segment of the colony’s
elite. There are, however, problems with Jackson’s argument. Whitefield published his
attack on southern slave owners in the summer of 1740. Yet his reputation in Charles-
ton reached its apogee after that date. When Whitefield was later arrested, it was before
Bryan’s slave school had really got off the ground. Moreover, Garden also started a
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school for teaching Christianity to the slaves during the 1740s without suffering any
loss of standing with the elite.40 Given these facts, racial fears do not explain sufficiently
the sudden hostility encountered by Whitefield at the end of 1740.
On the other hand, Garden’s identification of the evangelist with Roman Ca-
tholicism might offer a better unraveling of what was going on in South Carolinians’
minds. Garden delivered a barrage of sermons and published most of the docu-
ments examined above between the summer of 1740, when Whitefield’s popularity
was strong, and the end of the year, when the evangelist fell into disgrace. The theme
of “popery” in Garden’s sermons was certainly a topical one: stories about the threat
from Catholic Spain filled the South-Carolina Gazette, which at this time printed more
reports about the war than about any other topic.41 Moreover, white South Carolin-
ians knew well that Spanish authorities in St. Augustine had been encouraging slaves
to escape from South Carolina and to find freedom under Spanish rule. Many in the
colony blamed Spain for the Stono Rebellion of 1739.42 Garden’s ability to link
Whitefield’s beliefs and practices to well-established Catholic stereotypes, coming in
the context of real and perceived Catholic threats, must have alarmed many of those
who were not utterly committed to the evangelist. Whether or not Garden’s readers
accepted the notion that Whitefield was literally a papal emissary, Garden certainly
had ensured that the public image of Whitefield was overshadowed by familiar anti-
Catholic stereotypes that were deeply embedded in Anglo-Protestant culture. Once
the notion of Whitefield as “papist” had been planted, the Great Awakening could
be conceived of as part of a Catholic plot to plunge South Carolina into chaos, a plot
that could include military invasion and slave insurrections.
This analysis of Garden’s attack on Whitefield arrives at some unusual conclu-
sions about the way that white South Carolinians of the mid-eighteenth century viewed
the world around them. While most historians have argued that race was the funda-
mental factor in the mental world of the colony’s elite, this paper stresses the colo-
nists’ anti-Catholicism. To some extent, these different conclusions are the result of
different methodologies. Social historians, focusing on demographic data, have been
impressed by the fact that white South Carolinians in 1740 were a small minority in a
society that was overwhelmingly African.43 Such historians have assumed that objec-
tive demographic facts must have been fundamental in shaping whites’ worldview.
By contrast, I have relied on discourse analysis, a tool of cultural history. Cultural
historians stress that objective reality is heavily interpreted by historical subjects who
view the world around them through a cultural lens that magnifies some objects, di-
minishes others, and colors all of them according to the values of the particular cul-
tural system. Garden’s discourse about Whitefield suggests that he and his readers were
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viewing their New World context through cultural spectacles brought over from
Europe. Through these spectacles, the small Spanish garrison at St. Augustine loomed
large, overshadowing the more numerous population of enslaved Africans. This popu-
lation was visible to Garden, but its significance was understood in terms of Old
World value systems: Garden feared the African majority as the possible agents of
Catholic mischief-making rather than as a threat in its own right. Of course, Garden
was but a single individual within the white elite population, albeit a well-connected
and influential individual. It is possible to question how far his worldview was shared
by all South Carolina whites. Still, Garden’s attack on the evangelist, unusual for its
extensive insights into contemporary value systems, suggests one broad conclusion:
there may be ways of interpreting eighteenth-century South Carolina history other
than the-now-traditional, race-centered view.
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“Christ is Out, Communism is On”
Opposition to the Congress of Industrial Organizations’s
“Operation Dixie” in South Carolina, 1946–1951
Jonathan Gentry
Opposition to the attempts of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) toorganize southern textile workers in the post-war period was multi-faceted. Two
forms—anti-communism and religious conservatism—manifested themselves in the
South during the post-World War II period, particularly from 1946 to 1951 when the
CIO conducted a major organizing drive nicknamed Operation Dixie by journalists.
Anti-communism and religious conservatism underlay the opposition of local newspa-
per editors, community leaders, and politicians to labor’s attempts to organize in the
South. The issue of communist involvement in the CIO had long been used as a weapon
against its northern and western unions, but it would prove less successful against the
more politically conservative southern unions and their openly anti-communist lead-
ership.1 During Operation Dixie in South Carolina, the CIO faced heated attacks
from citizens’ committees, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and Protestant clergy for its
policy of organizing workers regardless of color and for the support it received
from the Catholic church and its supposed infiltration by godless communists.
During and after World War II, northern mill owners had continued the pre-
war trend of shifting more of their textile production to the pro-business environ-
ment of the South. Consequently, the number of textile workers had increased
significantly, and by war’s end the number of industrial workers as a whole had
risen from a pre-war level of 1.6 million to 2.4 million. A wartime labor shortage
and a War Labor Board that enforced minimum wages and union security, how-
ever, had compelled mill owners to cease their assault on unionization. Thus by
1945, the CIO had been able to increase its southern  membership to about one
hundred seventy-five thousand and had become confident it could acquire more. 2
In March 1946, the executive board of the CIO developed a Southern Orga-
nizing Committee (SOC) and planned a southern labor drive. The time seemed
ripe as layoffs and work reductions in several industries, particularly textiles, had
resulted in less take-home pay. In addition, mill owners in South Carolina were
planning to initiate a five-year modernizing program that would invest over $50
million in new machinery and result in even more cutbacks. In May 1946 the CIO
launched Operation Dixie under the direction of its SOC. Organizers in the cam-
paign sought to recruit 1.5 million unorganized, unskilled southern workers within
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one year while maintaining their local unions. To date, Operation Dixie remains the
largest and longest-sustained organizing drive in the South. With over a million dol-
lars contributed by member unions and about two hundred fifty full-time organiz-
ers, the CIO sought to organize 2.4 million workers in twelve southern states in
industries such as textile, tobacco, furniture, chemical, oil, and steel production.
Money and manpower, much of it from the Textile Workers Union of America
(TWUA), dictated that the SOC concentrate its resources on the half-million textile
workers in the Piedmont region of the Carolinas.3
To avoid being labeled radical, the CIO shunned controversial tactics. Conse-
quently, it used mostly southern organizers in Operation Dixie, took an anti-commu-
nist stance, and forbade integrated union meetings. Indeed, veteran southern
organizers, many of whom were white males with anti-communist and anti-integra-
tion leanings, constituted 75 percent or more of the CIO organizers. To avoid nega-
tive publicity, South Carolina mill owners adjusted their tactics as well. They refrained
from hiring strike breakers, instead delivering their message through the radio, news-
paper and their religious mouthpiece, the mill preacher, and they took  advantage
of post-war prosperity to forestall or break strikes simply by raising wages. Both sides
sought to use the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to their advantage—unions
by filing protests against a mill for unfair labor practices and owners by delaying
union recognition elections. Overall, the mill owners had more success than the
CIO in using the NLRB to their advantage.4
In addition to anti-communism, rival unionism plagued the CIO’s attempts to
organize in the South. To counter Operation Dixie, the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) mobilized 3,300 organizers in an organizing campaign of its own. The
Southern Director of the AFL, George Googe, kicked off the AFL campaign by un-
abashedly informing southerners of the new “communist” threat posed by the latest
CIO organizing drive. AFL President William Green’s comments on Operation Dixie
were typical: “Neither reactionary employers nor communists in the CIO can stop
the campaign of the American Federation of Labor to enroll 1,000,000 unorganized
southern workers in the next twelve months,” and he advised southern mill owners
to “grow and cooperate with us or fight for your life against communist forces.”5 The
AFL’s “organization drive” appears simply to have been an attempt to hinder sup-
port for Operation Dixie.
Religious conservatives and the Southern Industrial Council also attacked
Operation Dixie. The Council in its  newspaper, Militant Truth, warned southerners
that the CIO sought social and economic equality between blacks and whites. Con-
servative ministers frequently asserted that the CIO’s initials stood for “Christ is Out—
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Communism is On.” Neither this opposition, however, nor the initial unresponsive-
ness of mill workers disheartened CIO organizers. They largely ignored it and con-
centrated on using supportive ministers to win over uncommitted workers.6
From the beginning, Operation Dixie faced problems far more serious than
the AFL, KKK or religious conservatives. Embarrassingly, it had underestimated the
cost of funding Operation Dixie and had overestimated its ability to attract new
members. Rising inflation and the maintenance of striking workers were costing
$144,000 a month without a comparable influx of union dues. In the fall of 1946 at
an annual CIO convention in Atlantic City, the delegates received the bad news—
the organizing campaign had spent $800,000 of the appropriated $1 million, and
the SOC’s already pitiful staff and budget would have to be cut by about one half.
These constraints meant the SOC would have to pool its resources and concentrate
only on textiles, particularly those mills that looked most promising. In South Caro-
lina this meant the remaining eight organizers with only a $4,700 budget would have
to be employed in towns like Rock Hill where the TWUA had met with success.7
Though some headway was achieved in Rock Hill, Columbia, and Clifton, the
CIO’s attempts to organize in South Carolina made few gains. By October 1949 only
forty elections had been held involving some eleven thousand workers. Though the
TWUA won thirty-three of these, they netted only about seventy-six hundred new
members. The TWUA never succeeded in organizing more than 12 percent of South
Carolina’s textile workers and probably never had more than a total of sixteen thou-
sand members.8 For the reason it failed to organize the South Carolina textile indus-
try one must look to anti-union opposition.
Most of the opposition to Operation Dixie in South Carolina took place in the
heartland of the textile industry in the Piedmont and upstate. Predictably, the stron-
gest opposition took place in areas where the CIO showed the strongest presence, or
in areas with a tradition of union opposition like Rock Hill and Anderson. Ander-
son, with an anti-union tradition dating at least back to 1916, was considered by
organizers to be the stronghold of anti-unionist activity. Its citizens formed the Ander-
son Citizens Committee in February 1950 to combat CIO activity in the area. The
committee not only published weekly attacks against the TWUA but also kept the
CIO off Anderson’s air waves and defeated its attempts to organize in the town’s
textile plants.9 Most of the anti-union literature in the CIO’s SOC papers emanated
from Anderson. Dr. C. S. Breedin of Anderson, one of the town’s chief anti-union
spokesmen, wrote several letters filled with racist and religious bigotry to National
Director George Baldanzi. He thanked “. . . God we do have some ministers of the
Gospel who have guts enough to preach from their pulpits the curses of your hellish
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organization.”10 He also wrote a bitter denunciation of the Catholic Church, which had
issued two resolutions in January 1951 supporting the CIO’s labor organizing in the
South. It is doubtful that Breedin spoke for 90 percent of Anderson’s citizens as he
claimed to, but he probably spoke for the majority.11
Other upstate towns also had their share of anti-unionists. Spartanburg, the
headquarters of the CIO in South Carolina, contained a strong anti-unionist ele-
ment. The Textile Tribune, a small paper published by R. L. DeYoung of Spartanburg,
was known for smearing the CIO with the taint of communism. Although the CIO
had thoroughly cleansed itself of the communist “menace” by 1950, DeYoung and
other southern small-time textile newspapermen still attacked it for communist lean-
ings. In an angry letter to DeYoung, Earl Smith, a business agent for the TWUA from
Converse, referred to the fact that though the CIO specifically prohibited commu-
nists from holding office and had expelled eleven affiliated unions at the cost of
some one million members, employers and newspapermen still exploited the com-
munist issue. Many CIO officials like South Carolina Director Franz Daniel prided
themselves on the CIO’s anti-communist shift from 1949 to 1950 and hoped they
had rid themselves of the communist stigma.12 Unfortunately, such sacrifices mat-
tered little to their opponents who were attacking the CIO not for its communist
membership but because it dared to organize in the South.
To better understand union opposition in South Carolina, its is important to
examine how that opposition took shape in textile mills like the Aragon-Baldwin
Mill in Rock Hill owned by J. P. Stevens. J.P. Stevens’s opposition to the CIO’s cam-
paigns at its Aragon-Baldwin Mill proved both extensive and virulent. During the
second attempt to organize the mill in 1946, company officials warned workers that
if they voted for the union the company might close the mill and move it to another
state or to Mexico. Though the workers did not need reminding, management made
it clear that the company had the power to evict families from company-owned homes
in the mill village. During a third organizing attempt at Aragon-Baldwin, mill fore-
men, to intimidate workers into refusing CIO literature, routinely stood at the mill
gates beside organizers who were handing out leaflets. Some union workers who had
been fired by the company were told they could have their jobs back with additional
benefits if they destroyed their union cards. The Aragon-Baldwin management prob-
ably also pressured the local radio station—WRHI, which was broadcasting the CIO’s
fifteen minute weekly spots—into censoring the CIO’s already inoffensive dialogue.
Because of pressure by the radio station on CIO organizers to dilute their broad-
casts, the CIO was forced to switch to another station. These tactics were effective in
reducing union enrollment, but mill owners in the South had two primary weap-
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ons—their ability to delay the NLRB’s holding of  union recognition elections and
their power to circumvent the union local’s strength by raising wages. The use of
both during an organizing drive often crippled the CIO’s attempts to win elections
by severely damaging union morale.13
Organizers repeatedly complained to Director Daniel about the time it took
the NLRB to call for a union recognition election at Aragon-Baldwin and the damag-
ing effect the delay had on morale. Mills throughout the South faced similar situa-
tions. Knowing that it had the TWUA in an awkward situation, J. P. Stevens was able
to delay elections by either interjecting unreasonable demands on the union or fil-
ing complaints against it. J.P. Stevens also used the infamous Taft-Hartley law passed
in June 1947 to its advantage. Among other things, the law gave employers (or their
agents) greater freedom to speak out against the union prior to an election and
defined “employer” in terms so broad that citizens’ committees were excluded from
NLRB jurisdiction. The cumbersome law created a mountain of litigation, most of it
brought by local unions, who were charging employers eager to explore the new
confines of a much less restrictive labor law with unfair labor practices. According to
Timothy Minchin, “by October 1947 the NLRB had the greatest backlog of cases in
its eleven year history.” This backlog, combined with the fact that the NLRB was
understaffed and underfunded, made the election process much longer than neces-
sary. Minchin wrote that “by March 1948 it took almost twice as long for the board to
conduct an election as it had in 1946.”14
Wage increases, too, made union elections and contracts difficult to win dur-
ing the first two years of Operation Dixie. In July 1946 fifteen union locals represent-
ing more than fifteen thousand workers in the state demanded free health insurance
and a twelve cent raise—an increase of the minimum wage from sixty-five to seventy-
seven cents an hour. Mill owners in the Carolinas immediately responded by issuing
an eight cent raise in most of their mills. One organizer in Rock Hill found unorga-
nized workers especially unreceptive after these wage increases, and many workers
questioned why they needed to pay union dues to receive what they were already
getting anyway.15
Companies also used other tactics to mitigate union gains. After union work-
ers at the Bleachery in Rock Hill fought to get free insurance in their union contract
in the fall of 1946, several unorganized mills in the area announced free insurance
programs. Mill owners also went to court to obtain injunctions against striking work-
ers to limit their ability to picket. Violence, though rare, was used clandestinely by
anti-union workers and perhaps by mill owners to intimidate strikers. The director
of the CIO’s SOC, John V. Riffe, was brutally beaten and almost killed by some anti-
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union thugs in Columbia in March 1949. In May 1951 daily violence broke out be-
tween strikers and anti-union workers at the Industrial Cotton Mill in Rock Hill. One
non-union worker’s house was dynamited. The violence prevalent during this par-
ticular campaign combined with the mill’s success in blaming it on the union killed
an attempt to organize the nearby Springs Mills plant in Fort Mill. Violence was not
the norm, however, since mill owners could often stifle union morale simply by call-
ing out the local police force to “protect” non-union workers.16
Though retired organizers have cited apathetic workers and stifling mill vil-
lages as reasons for the CIO’s failure to organize the South, religious opposition,
often with racial and anti-communist overtones, provides a better explanation. Al-
though several mainstream denominations sanctioned the organizing of labor, min-
isters in mill churches often spoke out against the CIO as an “evil” organization run
by atheistic communists. They accused it of forcing whites to work alongside blacks
and of driving businesses out of the state by raising wages above the amount employ-
ers wanted to pay. Ministers warned workers that the union would starve their fami-
lies by charging dues and keeping them out on strike. In South Carolina, particularly
in the upstate, religious leaders took the initiative in attacking the CIO.17 In Septem-
ber 1946 Lucy Randolph Mason, chief public relations official for the SOC and Op-
eration Dixie, reported to State Director Daniel about strong religious opposition in
the upstate, citing particularly the towns of Liberty and Easley near Anderson. In
Easley, Mason found a Baptist minister who forced union members in the church to
chose between it and the CIO. At a nearby Baptist church, a young pro-union Sun-
day School superintendent was asked to leave. In the middle of a CIO organizing
drive at the Pacific Mills in Lyman in March 1949, a Baptist minister told his church
members that “it’s either Christ or the CIO. You can be a Christian or a CIO man,
but you can’t be both.” Mason wrote to a pro-union Baptist minister and friend la-
menting the fact that “so many Baptist preachers are against the union” and that
their forcing parishioners to chose between God and the CIO was having “a disas-
trous effect on organization.”18
Most studies of Operation Dixie cast it as unmitigated failure and, in a haze of
introspection and criticism, postulate alternate outcomes. It would have been more
successful, they say, if only the CIO had been more inclusive towards blacks, more
internally united, more committed to industry-wide organizing, or more militant.
Lacking is an accurate picture of the labor environment of the period, and, more
importantly, of southern opposition to the CIO. The southern worker, labor orga-
nizer, union, and mill culture are not primarily responsible for the defeat of the CIO
in the South. Anti-communist and conservative religious elements in the South coa-
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lesced successfully to combat the “evil menace” of the CIO. Mill preachers and con-
servative community leaders fought strenuously against the “vice” of unionism and
for the “virtue” of union-free mills. Communism and racism served as excellent weap-
ons for these men in their quest to combat union organizing. When wage increases
failed to entice “rebellious” workers back into the fold, these men would raise the
specter of communism or integration effectively to combat the CIO’s attempts to
build strong union locals. Because they understood the tactics of southern anti-union-
ists, most southern CIO organizers decided to focus on winning elections and stay-
ing away from controversial issues such as race and communism. Though they chose
the less radical, less militant course, it was the only course available to them given the
historical and social realities of the time. Segregation, anti-communism and a his-
tory of union failures in the South existed for decades prior to Operation Dixie. A
labor campaign, particularly one as weak as Operation Dixie, would not stand a chance
if it tried to organize southern workers while challenging their political and social
beliefs. Perhaps southern workers remain unorganized today because the forces that
defeated Operation Dixie continue to convince them they have everything to lose
and nothing to gain from joining a union.
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From Cracked to Perfect Bottles
Laurens Glass Works: 1910–1986
Fritz Hamer
Looking back fifty years in 1975, Hugh Morgan Sr. reflected nostalgically aboutthe Laurens Glass Works where he had worked since 1925. Having observed a
steady expansion of the plant over those years the retired employee reflected that,
“Some of us old timers will miss a part of the new things that are on the way.” 1
Indeed the Laurens plant had seen amazing growth since its founding in 1910. From
renovated furniture factory building with an estimated workforce of fifty to seventy-
five, it had grown into a major manufacturer of glass bottles and containers with
employment at more than eight hundred by the early 1970s. Yet the rosy future that
Morgan predicted proved illusory. By 1996 after mergers with several larger glass
manufacturers over two decades, Laurens Glass would close its doors for good. This
paper is an initial study—an overview of the founding of Laurens Glass, its labor-
management relations, and its successful growth and expansion over the decades.
For more than eighty years its well crafted soft drink bottles, its stable work force,
and its many clients throughout the Southeast and beyond made it one of the pre-
mier manufacturers in the region. Unfortunately, in the 1970s, the success it had
achieved was slowly but steadily being displaced by the advent of plastic containers.
Ironically, Laurens Glass almost failed before it really began. The company’s
early history is sketchy, however, since few documents about its origins remain. It
started with great fanfare as the state’s second glass bottle producer. Columbia had
the distinction of having the Palmetto State’s first—Carolina Glass Company—which
had opened in 1902 initially to produce bottles for the controversial South Carolina
Dispensary.2 When this state monopoly was eliminated in 1907 the Columbia firm
focused on soda, mineral water and medicine bottles. But for unknown reasons it
closed in 1913. The Laurens project was the brainchild of a few prominent business
and political leaders in the Laurens community led by Nathaniel Dial. A lawyer and
businessman who seemed to epitomize the New South ideal of economic progress,
Dial already had established a textile mill in Ware Shoals, a bank in Laurens, several
power plants, and other entrepreneurial ventures in the upstate. Along with five
other Laurens business leaders Dial formed a partnership with a capital investment
of $50,000 to “manufacture bottles, glass, glassware . . .” and other articles usually
made by a glass factory. The new enterprise also planned to mine and quarry stone,
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rocks, and the “products and by-products thereof.”3 Speculation remains regarding
why these men chose to establish their plant in this particular upstate town, but there
may have been at least two reasons. The essential ingredients for glass production are
sand (silica), soda ash, lime, and feldspar. One of these, sand, naturally occurs in
Laurens County. Marion and Lexington counties, in eastern and central South Caro-
lina respectively, have high quality natural glass sand deposits.4 It is also possible that
they saw a chance to emulate Carolina Glass Company, which was still operating.
When the first shift began in January 1911, local interest was high. A departure from
the textile enterprises that had proliferated throughout the upstate by this time,
Laurens Glass Works must have seemed an unusual attraction. Some of the earliest
bottles produced went to the local Sanders Bottling Works, but the enterprise lacked
sufficient expertise. By late 1911 the firm halted production because of persistent
problems with the quality of its glass.5
Laurens simply seemed to lack workers with sufficient skills and knowledge to
produce bottles that were of consistent quality. During this era glass making was as
much an art as a science. Without skilled personnel to measure the raw materials
accurately, the glass produced often shattered or cracked in the mold. And when the
glass bottle came out of the mold—at several hundred degrees or more—it had to
be slowly cooled in an annealing machine or luhr. No matter how well the raw ingre-
dients were measured in the furnace, glass that cooled too quickly would crack or
shatter as well.6 It is unclear what the specific problems were during the first months
of production at Laurens Glass, but it appeared that one or both of these problems
existed. Consequently, while the plant remained out of production for a year, the
investors recruited people who had the knowledge and experience to make a quality
product. This meant that the southern owners looked north to production centers
in Indiana, Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and New Jersey where glass manufacturing
had become a mature industry since at least the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Production resumed at Laurens Glass in early 1913 with better results. During
the following two decades most of its clients came from the upstate and from other
communities within South Carolina and contiguous states. Bottles were produced
for mineral water producers such as Chick Springs in Greenville County and Harris
Springs in southern Laurens County. Medicine bottles were also made for local drug-
gists such as Orangeburg’s Wannamacker Manufacturer. 7
One of its first major soda drink bottle contracts was with Coca-Cola. Until
1899 Coke had been a fountain drink, but as the new century began a Chattanooga
firm received permission to bottle the drink for distribution to a wider clientele. As
a result, by 1915 Laurens became one of three southern firms to produce Coke
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bottles. Contracts for Coke would be one of the firm’s mainstays during its first de-
cade of production. The business relationship with Coke would continue for the
next seven decades. The upstate plant made several types of Coke bottles, ranging
from the classic six-ounce hobble skirt shape patented in 1915 to the twelve-ounce
and commemoratives made later in the century.8
Laurens Glass Works steadily grew over the next several years despite occa-
sional setbacks caused by economic downturns or war. Before World War I the plant
saw production cut back and work shifts reduced to one a day for periods of several
weeks. During the post-war depression of the early twenties, the Laurens firm had to
shut down production for several months but resumed work in early 1922.9 In spite
of slowdowns the reputation of its product did not appear to suffer. Contracts with
Coke bottlers throughout the region continued to grow, while new clients in the
Southeast, both big and small, sought the Laurens product. Laurens Glass bottles
from the Holcombe collection show that southeastern bottlers of Frosty Root Beer,
Dr Pepper (Waco, Texas), Pepsi (Eastern North Carolina), CheroCola (Columbus,
Georgia), among many others, had contracts with the upcountry bottle manufac-
turer during the twenties and thirties. Smaller bottlers such as Game Cock Ginger
Ale (Greenville) and the firm of Strawhorn and Seago (Greenwood) also ordered
from Laurens Glass.10
To turn out bottles of enough quantity and quality required production and
organization skills that Laurens Glass had acquired after its initial difficulties. Al-
though some accounts claim that its glass blowers and their assistants made bottles
by hand in the first decade of production, these claims are only partially accurate at
best. Extant Laurens bottles show that until 1920 the body of the container was pro-
duced in a machine mold. Then the top portion where the lip and neck came to-
gether had to be tooled by hand. It is uncertain how many bottles could be made
with this method. In 1911 it was estimated that in the first months of production the
fledgling firm would soon produce “a cartload of bottles . . .  daily.” It is unclear how
much this amount would have been. As late as 1922, after work had just resumed
following several months of inactivity, bottle production was estimated at two hun-
dred to two hundred fifty per day.11 By 1925, when bottle production was completely
mechanized, Laurens had at least one tank to mix and create the molten glass while
two Lynch L.A. machines produced fourteen to sixteen bottles per minute. Produc-
tion had increased so substantially by the following year that Laurens Glass claimed
to produce twenty-five million soft drink bottles annually. While this may be an exag-
geration, it is certain that the firm’s production rate accelerated significantly during
the twenties. It is likely that several million bottles were produced annually by the
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middle of the decade.12 Even as bottle production increased at significant rates after
1925 some procedures were still based on manpower. Hugh Morgan recalled that at
this time Laurens Glass still used human power to pull the finished but still hot
bottles through the long lehr machine to cool the containers gradually. Sometime
later a machine-powered belt replaced the hand-pulled chains in the lehr. The plant
continued to enhance its mechanization through the following decades while in-
creasing its production volume by several magnitudes. Yet until the 1950s Laurens
continued to mix the sand and the other ingredients by hand, measured in pounds
per wheelbarrow load.13
Despite the Great Depression of the 1930s Laurens continued to thrive and
even expand its operation. More tanks and new machines were added periodically
to replace or upgrade old ones. By 1932 the Glass Works had three tanks and eight
automatic machines. Later in the decade Laurens Glass made a large, new invest-
ment in more equipment at a cost of $400,000, which probably included machinery
for the new bottle labeling process, Applied Colored Labels.14 This process enabled
the firm to produce a label that was more durable and colorful than the label pro-
duced by the traditional paper label application and embossing process, which had
been used up to that time. With this new ability the firm’s growth was assured, espe-
cially after 1945. In 1946 over $600,000 was invested to expand and add new equip-
ment, including a new building with an additional furnace and more bottle making
machinery. By the late 1950s Laurens Glass could not keep up with demand despite
five furnaces and eight bottle-making machines. Thus in 1959 a second bottle plant
opened in Henderson (North Carolina) followed by a third in Ruston (Louisiana)
early the following decade. The firm’s zenith appeared to have been reached in the
late sixties when the national glass producing firm, Indian Head Glass, bought it out.15
While leadership and investment money were crucial to the success of the
Glass Works, an experienced, skilled work force was just as important. In the wake of
the glass quality problems in 1911 management hired many glass workers out of the
glassmaking regions of the Midwest and Northeast. Fortunately, the Laurens Glass
owners had the money and time to recruit the experienced labor they needed. Glass-
blowers, assistants, and other specialized workers from Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey were recruited while the plant remained inactive for about a year.
William Bryant, the operating manager, came from Ohio and brought several more
glass blowers and assistants with him. John Finkbeiner, a native of Germany, brought
his wife and four sons from Clarion County in West Pennsylvania, another center of
glass production. By 1920 Finkbeiner was superintendent of the Glass Works and
had two sons, Albert and Rudolph, employed as glass blowers. His second eldest son,
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Robert, brought his own young family with him to work in Laurens as a glassblower.
George Creamer from Streator (Illinois) brought his glass knowledge to Laurens as
well. Frank Barber from New Jersey served as a glass blower in Laurens and brought
his wife with him from the Garden State.16
Just as important to the operation were the mold makers. Although Laurens
purchased molds from factories in Toledo (Ohio) and other midwestern factories, these
skilled mold makers had to make and revise the mold designs to suit each order and to
repair them when necessary. One of the first in the groups of mold makers who came
to Laurens was the Zupp family. Adam Zupp came from New York, where he probably
learned the mold trade from his German-born father. He was probably recruited to
join the fledgling upstate firm in 1913. It was in the Laurens Glass Works that he later
taught his son, George, the trade. By the middle of the century the younger Zupp
would teach the trade to the next generation of mold makers.17
The census data of 1920 seem to indicate that most, if not all, of the skilled
work force came from the Midwest and East, while the laborers who unloaded the
ingredients for glass making, loaded the finished bottles, and did other less skilled
jobs were locals, and often African American. Thus while people like Finkbeiner and
Zupp operated the skilled parts of the operation, African Americans like Martin
Meadors, Chester Henry, and Ella Duckett from South Carolina made up much of
the less skilled labor force. Nevertheless some whites like J. M. Rogers were in these
positions as well. Although sixty-four years old, Rogers worked in the packing crew of
the Glass Works preparing finished bottles for shipment.18
Despite the racial divide between skilled and less skilled labor, wages appeared
higher than for comparable jobs in the upstate’s major industry, textiles. In 1913
wages were “nearly equivalent” to those of each of the local textile mills. Although
this is speculative, it is reasonable to assume that management had to compete with
the textile industry to attract and keep the skilled workers necessary for a viable
operation. This situation also seemed to apply to less skilled jobs. By the 1940s wages
appeared better than for most textile occupations of equivalent status. Less skilled
positions in the warehouse and loading section were able to attract Bill Mills, an
African American, who began working there in 1939. Because everything was loaded
into boxcars by hand, the hours were long and difficult. Yet Mills left only because of
World War II. In 1946 he returned to the plant to resume his old job and remained
there for the rest of his career, retiring in the late 1970s.19
Some families had two or three generations who worked at Laurens Glass. The
Finkbeiners worked in both skilled and managerial positions up through the 1970s,
as did the Zupp family. Many other employees without a generational connection
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still remained there throughout their careers. Warehouse Manager Furman Parris
started as a laborer at the plant in 1962 and stayed more than four decades, earning
promotions until he became shipping manager. Ten years earlier Hugh Edwards
had begun his career in the decorating department where ACL labels were baked on
bottles. When Laurens stopped the production of soda drink bottles in the mid-
eighties he had to change duties but remained at the plant until his retirement in
the 1990s. Those workers interviewed agreed that throughout the last half-century
of the firm’s life, pay and working conditions were the best in the area .20
Women were also part of the work force. Until the late 1930s or 1940s they
worked only in the office in what appear to have been secretarial positions. When
the ACL process was introduced prior to World War II, women began to work in the
decorating department. By 1946 they were integral to this process at Laurens Glass.
Some women loaded bottles into boxes after the labels were applied. Others loaded
unlabeled bottles into the ACL machines to have the markings applied. Some fami-
lies had both spouses employed at the plant for several years. By the last year of
Laurens Glass’ operation, Melody Motes had put in twenty years at the plant. Her
husband had worked there for thirty-four years. A brother-in-law had put in twenty-
one, and her son, aged twenty-five, had worked several years for the company.21
This seemingly ideal work place for men and women nevertheless had a union
organization at least as early as 1919. Officers for local Branch 35 of the National
Glass Bottle Blowers Association included Dan Dowdy, president, and L. W. Higbe,
vice president. By the 1940s there were two locals in the plant, which apparently
represented the white and black workforce. In 1970 these branches were integrated
in conformance with the era’s integration in other sectors of southern society. How
much impact the union had on labor-management relations during the plant’s early
decades is unknown. Nevertheless, by the middle of the century it had a significant
role. The first documented strike in late 1951 lasted six weeks. Details are sketchy,
but one cause appeared to be the Union’s demand to represent all workers in labor
contracts. Another issue concerned modernization. Bill Mills recalled that manage-
ment tried to dismiss those on the work force who were deemed too inefficient to
aid in the modernization of production at that time. The final agreement that ended
the strike in early December was not disclosed. It appeared that management pre-
vented the union from winning its demand for sole right to represent the work force
in future negotiations. Workers, however, estimate that during the last two decades
of the firm’s operation more than 80 percent of employees were paid union mem-
bers. Whether the strike forced management to stop dismissing workers as the plant
modernized is unknown. 22
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Other job actions occurred in the sixties and seventies. In 1968 a seven-week
strike ended in March after management agreed to pay increases for all employees. In
the 1970s the Laurens firm stayed closed for five weeks when a national strike was
called by the union over dual job responsibilities during the same shift. Management
did not want employees to spend their entire eight-hour shift monitoring automatic
machines that required little maintenance. They argued that this was too costly and
that workers should do other jobs while they monitored the machines. The compro-
mise eventually reached allowed workers a two-hour monitoring limit so supervisors
could assign them to other duties during their eight-hour shift. One mold shop worker
recalling this strike remembered that most of the work force opposed the job action,
but since it was mandated by the national union, the local chapter had to comply.23
In any event, friction between management and labor was minimal most of
the time. Various indicators suggest that relations were usually harmonious. After
Nathaniel Dial and his original investors helped the Laurens firm get started, Dial’s
nephew, Albert Dial, assumed leadership of the firm. The younger Dial was the inspi-
ration behind Laurens Glass. He led the reorganization and hiring of skilled work-
ers from the Midwest and East and oversaw the firm’s establishment in the glass
bottle business before his premature death in 1928.24
Ernest Easterby succeeded the younger Dial, and he, too, became a force be-
hind the glass plant’s survival and early growth. Also a Laurens native, Easterby had
progressed through the ranks and worked alongside Albert Dial. Once he assumed
the leadership of the firm he remained its president for over forty years. He earned
the respect of most employees at Laurens Glass. Those who worked under his re-
gime until his death in 1974 remember his even-handed demeanor and encourag-
ing comments on and off the production floor. Born in 1888, he had worked at the
upstate firm from its early days and was an important collaborator with Albert Dial in
resurrecting the fledgling firm after its initial failure in 1911. He relinquished his
post as president in 1971 but stayed as chairman of the board until his death. The
success of Laurens Glass under his long tenure indicated his sound managerial skills,
which kept most confrontations between management and labor to a minimum.25
Some of Easterby’s style had a practical purpose. Work inside a glass plant was
dirty, dangerous, and hot, with molten glass sometimes at temperatures of nearly
3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Flexibility in management was a necessity to maintain
good morale. And with skilled workers it was important to keep them satisfied. One
by-product of this flexible attitude can be seen in the whimsies or after-hour glass
created on the production line. These idiosyncratic glass ornaments were fashioned
during second and third shifts when management supervision was minimal or when
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there was a break in production. It is uncertain when the practice began, but work-
ers were producing such items in the early 1960s. Glass ashtrays, canes, various odd
shaped design pieces, and long-necked objects formed while glass was still pliable
were created by workers when they could do so and when they thought supervisors
were not around. These items were taken home or given away to fellow workers.
Robert Young, who worked in the mold shop for over thirty years, recalled that he
sometimes made pieces of cast iron into a mold to make ashtrays and other glass
trinkets. Sometimes his imagination went beyond simple designs and led to unex-
pected benefits for his employers. In the 1970s when the C. F. Sauer Company of
Richmond, Virginia, was preparing to celebrate its centennial year of producing
mayonnaise and other condiments, Young decided he would do a small batch of jars
to commemorate this anniversary. He created designed molds with “Happy 100th
Anniversary C. F Sauer” embossed on the side. Six dozen were produced and sent to
the regional manager in Greenville, South Carolina. When Sauer managers saw them
they were so impressed that nearly fifteen hundred more were ordered. Although
such independent action probably was unusual, whimsies continued to be made until
the plant closed. And while some employees claimed that the firm’s management
knew of the practice, it rarely interfered and, if it did, the resulting reprimand was
mild and without repercussions.26
Although whimsies represented the longest enduring piece of spontaneous
creativity at Laurens, workers’ talent earned some special contracts. During the de-
cade of the sixties the upstate Glass Works was hired to make Coke bottles for an
Israeli customer who ordered Hebrew script on one side of the bottle. Only a few
remain today, and several of those working at the plant recall this order. About seven
cases were made and they were delivered to Charleston, presumably for shipment to
the Middle East.27
Perhaps the most prestigious order received by Laurens Glass Works was in
1963 and associated with one of the nation’s greatest tragedies. As Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson prepared to welcome President John F. Kennedy for a Texas visit
in November, he planned a reception for the nation’s chief executive at his Texas
ranch. Being a man who both respected and sought status, Johnson wanted soda
club bottles made with the vice presidential seal inscribed on each bottle. Laurens
Glass received an order for 2,400 Canada Dry Club Soda bottles with the stipulated
seal. They were shipped to a Waco, Texas bottler for filling. But Kennedy was assassi-
nated before Johnson’s reception could occur. In the aftermath of this tragic event,
the new President ordered all the bottles scrapped. Even though most probably were
destroyed, a few survived and are highly desired by bottle collectors today.28
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While these special contracts marked Laurens Glass Works as one of the nation’s
top bottle manufacturers, the importance of glass bottles in American stores and
households started to decline as plastic bottles and other containers began to re-
place them in the mid to late seventies. As this trend accelerated and larger and
larger conglomerates absorbed more bottling business, the upstate firm’s place in
the market declined.
Speculation surrounds the reasons for the 1968 sale of the family-run Laurens
Glass to Indian Head, a larger, national firm in Wilmington (Delaware). Publicly
Easterby claimed the merger gave Laurens better business opportunities. At the time
he still claimed that Laurens Glass management would remain in effective control
and the daily operations would remain the same. Reflecting on the merger years
later, employees have offered other reasons. One suggested that the family-operated
firm was losing its allure for the next generation of owners, its main shareholders.
The merger was an ideal opportunity to get out of the business and make a good
return on investments. Another explanation appears even more plausible. Having
observed changes in the container business over time, Easterby realized that in an-
other decade or so plastics would displace glass. He decided to sell to make the best
return for the original investors before the glass market fell. Whatever the reasons,
for the next decade production and sales remained good and thrived after Indian
Head moved its headquarters from Wilmington to Laurens in 1974. But later Indian
Head itself was absorbed. By 1990 Laurens had become a subsidiary of the container
conglomerate, Ball-InCon, based in Indiana. In 1986, with plastic bottles now domi-
nating the market, Laurens ceased glass soda bottle production and focused on glass
jars and containers for foods and medicines.29
Ten years later Laurens Glass announced its closing. With glass beverage bottles
virtually displaced by plastics, the attempt to find another niche in the glass con-
tainer business seemed out of place for a firm that had made its name with soda
bottles for so long. But the company’s final demise stemmed from more practical
business issues, namely old equipment, the plant’s inability to expand and accom-
modate updated machinery, and transportation costs. Since the upstate firm was
much further from major markets in the Northeast than was its Henderson plant,
management decided it was more economical to keep the Henderson plant operat-
ing. Freight charges from Henderson to places such as Washington, D.C., and New
York City were significantly cheaper.30 By the time Laurens closed, its work force had
already shrunk to half the size of its early-seventies maximum of over eight hundred.
Today the complex still stands. All its furnaces and bottle machines are gone, how-
ever, and huge empty spaces now occupy the once busy factory floors. Although
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Laurens Glass has been closed for less than a decade, few know its history or seem to
remember its importance to the economy of the upstate. Much more needs to be
done to unearth its rich heritage. Future study will hopefully shed more insight on
the early history of Laurens Glass and its founders, the evolving relationship be-
tween management and labor, and production changes that turned the smaller up-
state town into one of the Southeast’s major glass bottle manufacturers. This overview
is only a beginning to what is one of South Carolina’s most unique industrial sto-
ries.31
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Note on Laurens Glass bottles
The bulk of the bottles reviewed for this study was collected over more than two
decades by the Holcombe family in Clinton, South Carolina, some eighty of which
were borrowed for display in the SCSM exhibition, “Homeblown: Beverage Bottle of
Laurens Glass Works, 1910–1996.” The SCSM has a small bottle collection, which
includes Laurens Glass Works (LGW) examples, but these date to 1939 and after. To-
day many bottles of the post-1940 production era can be found in flea markets and
antique shops. Examples prior to 1939 are more difficult to find, especially those
from the plant’s first decade of production. This is, in large part, because Laurens
Glass did not identify its bottles until 1919. Starting at this time until the early 1960s
it affixed an embossed “LGW” on the base or corner-base of each bottle produced.
In the sixties the bottle identification changed to distinguish Laurens-produced bottles
from those of its branch plants in Henderson, North Carolina, and Ruston, Louisi-
ana. These new marks were “L” for Laurens-produced bottles, “L*” for those made
in Henderson, and “L**” for those that came from the Ruston plant.
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Righteous Lives: A Comparative Study
of the South Carolina Scalawag Leadership
During Reconstruction
Lewie Reece
Reconstruction was a profound revolutionary event in the political history ofSouth Carolina. Where once government had been controlled by a small elite,
under Reconstruction, the state came to experience a vibrant democracy. At the
heart of that democracy was the leadership of the Republican Party, which domi-
nated South Carolina politics from 1867 to 1877. Largely composed of African Ameri-
cans, the Reconstruction Republican Party included only a small minority of white
voters. While some of these white Republicans were carpetbaggers, many were na-
tive whites who, for a variety of reasons, associated with the Republican Party. Mocked
as scalawags by their peers, they often played an important role in the workings of
the party and played a key role in shaping its public policy, ideology, and electoral
strategy.
This paper attempts to address the role of scalawag Republicans by examining
four prominent scalawags who held positions of leadership: Simeon Corley, Edmund
Mackey, Samuel Melton, and Alexander Wallace. All four of these men showed a
willingness to extend to African Americans an opportunity to be treated as equals.
Each developed close relationships with the African American community and was
at least committed to political equality for African Americans. As a local party activist
Corley encouraged African Americans to register to vote. Wallace aided African
Americans in their struggles with racial violence in the upcountry. Melton and Mackey
both served in the U.S. Attorney’s Office where they prosecuted white Democrats
who denied the civil rights of African Americans. Their participation in the events of
Reconstruction hardly ended their influence in South Carolina politics. All four re-
mained involved in Republican politics and attempted to protect suffrage for Afri-
can Americans and white Republicans. These scalawags in South Carolina were not
simply political opportunists but rather sought the creation of a new, different kind
of politics in the state.
Alexander Wallace' early political career suggests the normal antebellum suc-
cess story. Despite a limited education, he eventually became a successful planter
and went on to serve several terms in the state legislature. When the war came Wallace
evidently disapproved of secession enough to withdraw from public life and make
no effort to serve in the Confederate Army. When the war was over he returned to
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active participation in politics, being re-elected to the South Carolina legislature in
1865. Prior then to the passage of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which gave the
vote to African Americans, Wallace’s political career was little different from other
South Carolina moderates. It is difficult to say precisely why he joined the Republi-
can Party; possibly he saw it as an organization that best reflected the concerns of
Southern Unionists. Yet once Wallace became a Republican he fully supported Afri-
can American political participation. Wallace went on to serve four terms in Con-
gress though as a congressman he kept a fairly low profile.1
Yet from the very beginning Wallace was vigilant in addressing acts of violence
against African American and white Republicans in the upcountry. Wallace fully sup-
ported the intervention of the federal government and worked with a congressional
investigating committee that examined activities of the Ku Klux Klan in his congres-
sional district. The massive federal intervention in York County seemed to unite white
and African American Republicans. Democrats complained that in the 1872 congres-
sional election some African Americans prevented others from voting against Wallace.2
In the aftermath of the federal intervention against the Klan, Wallace was a con-
sistent advocate of a federal presence to enforce voting rights. In 1874 when Attorney
General George Williams adopted a policy of reconciliation toward Klan violence,
Wallace complained that in a period of ten months, “only three men have been arrested
in York County charged with K.K. offenses.” Moreover, noting the upsurge of white
paramilitary groups, Wallace demanded intervention from the Justice Department. In
1876 he struggled against tremendous odds to be re-elected to Congress; Redshirt para-
military groups often directly attacked meetings that Wallace sought to lead. Wallace
noted that these groups would “surround the meetings on horse back” and often had
no purpose other than to break up gatherings of Republican voters. At one meeting
they shouted down Wallace while physically threatening him.
In spite of Wallace’s best efforts to be re-elected, he was overwhelmed by the
Democratic tide and was defeated. While Wallace’s defeat marked the end of his
official public involvement in Republican politics, he remained sufficiently inter-
ested in voting rights to commend Attorney General Charles Devens for his prosecu-
tions of Democrats in South Carolina. Wallace also cared enough about the proposed
repeal of the Enforcement Acts, which protected the voting rights of southern Re-
publicans, to to urge Republican Congressman James Garfield to get Republicans to
resist Democratic efforts at repeal. Tell the president to “stand firm” in the crisis
wrote Wallace to Garfield in 1879, for South Carolina Republicans approved of the
hard line national Republicans were taking on the issue. Thus Wallace’s support for
voting rights was a consistent policy from which he never wavered.3
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If Alexander Wallace’s political career demonstrates an enduring commitment
to voting rights, the political activism of Edmund Mackey suggests the close connec-
tion between white and African American Republicans in the lowcountry. Edmund
Mackey was the son of Albert Mackey, one of the more prominent Southern Union-
ists who resisted secession. In a long political career Mackey served as the sheriff of
Charleston County, an alderman for the city of Charleston, a state legislator, an assis-
tant U.S. Attorney, and a congressman. At the heart of Mackey’s political career was
a close intimacy between himself and African American politicians and voters. Such
closeness was perhaps best demonstrated during an election riot in Charleston in
1876 in which African Americans rushed to Mackey’s assistance to repel assaults by
white Democrats. Yet for all Mackey’s radicalism there were clear limits, for he broke
temporarily with the Republican organization to run for Congress as an Indepen-
dent Republican in 1874. Mackey also strongly supported Governor Chamberlain in
his efforts to reform and perhaps even deny some political appointments to African
Americans. Yet when Republicans struggled for political survival in the election of
1876, Mackey strived to maintain the Republican organization and to prevent the
Democratic takeover. As leader of Republicans in the state house, Mackey met the
crisis of the competing houses with equanimity. It was hardly Mackey’s fault that in
the end forces outside his control prevailed. Yet 1877 marked not the end of Mackey’s
political career but rather a new phase of political activity.4
When President Hayes recognized Wade Hampton as his official choice for gov-
ernor, he also sought to appoint Republicans who would be acceptable to the new
regime. The position of U. S. Attorney was extended to Lucius Northrop, a conserva-
tive Republican, whom Edmund Mackey’s uncle, the mercurial Thomas Jefferson
Mackey, once described as a “republican by profession.” Northrop, in putting forward
his name for the office, sought to make it clear that he distinctly disapproved of the
“constant use of the bayonet.” As a result Mackey’s selection as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney was no doubt seen by Hayes as something of a sop to party regulars in
South Carolina. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney Mackey proved to be a vigorous advo-
cate of using the law as a means to achieve justice for African American and white
Republicans. Such advocacy soon provoked the ire of the Charleston News and Cou-
rier. Mackey took great pains to point out to Attorney General Charles Devens that the
complaints of the publisher, Democratic politician Francis W. Dawson, were the con-
cerns of the guilty, who had directly participated in fraudulent ballot box stuffing.
Further, along with U. S. Marshal R. M. Wallace, Mackey took an interest in pro-
tecting the life of African American Republican Edmund Deas. Deas, a prominent
Darlington County legislator, was arrested as part of a campaign of intimidation and
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coercion launched by Democrats in the aftermath of the brutal 1878 elections. While
Northrop did nothing to prevent Deas from being arrested and detained for several
months, Mackey and Wallace made consistent efforts to secure his release. As Deas
ruefully noted, “Mackey and Wallace & others had been advising him to take steps in
my interest but he would not do it.” A consistent willingness to help Deas suggests
Mackey’s personal connections with African American Republican politicians in gen-
eral. It was this kind of relationship that could have induced Robert Smalls to en-
dorse Edmund Mackey as a compromise candidate for a congressional Republican
nomination in a district designed to elect an African American. That Mackey could
be so readily accepted by African American delegates in the 1880 election also sug-
gests that his political and personal conduct built a reputation of trust. Years after
Mackey died—all too young—his old friend and African American Republican Con-
gressman Thomas E. Miller complained that since the “death of Mackey” not enough
was done to keep Republican voters listed on the registration rolls. That Mackey’s
death could be used to mark the end of an era says a great deal about the impact he
made on lowcountry Republican politics.5
Like his fellow scalawags, Simeon Corley too served in Congress, but he main-
tained more of a local orientation to Lexington County throughout his political
career. Unlike the other three Republicans described in this paper, Corley was not
someone who was born into a prominent family nor did he have an antebellum
political career. Corley’s early training was that of a tailor. In his autobiography Corley
makes it clear that he took an interest in the issues of secession and Union in the
prewar years. An advocate of temperance, abolition, and preserving the Union at all
costs, Corley faced constant challenges. When secession did finally become a reality,
Corley accepted it begrudgingly and evidently resented being “compelled to enter
the Confederate army.” At the end of the war, when Corley returned to South Caro-
lina, his uncompromising Unionism made him “a lover of the Union,” and it was with
real enthusiasm that he took the oath of allegiance to the United States.6
Corley’s voice was not one that was heeded in South Carolina in 1865. Corley
described his being defeated as a delegate to the constitutional convention that year
as being primarily due to his “demanding more for colored men.” After the passage
of the Reconstruction Act, Corley became involved in the organization of the Re-
publican Party, especially in Lexington County. Early party building took place fairly
quickly in established urban centers such as Columbia and Charleston, but outside
those areas it required a more persistent effort. Aiding the party’s efforts was the fact
that many white conservatives refused to participate in the new registration of vot-
ers—as the Reconstruction Act required—and boycotted the elections held in 1868.
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Yet a sufficient number of white Union voters did participate in Lexington County,
and Corley claimed a “majority of white voters” cast ballots for the Republican ticket.
Corley clearly saw political affairs in South Carolina as an opportunity to arrive at a
new start for both whites and African Americans in the state. “The wants of the white
and colored race are precisely alike—their interests are identical.” In Corley’s view
then, Republican policies were designed to aid the poor of both races. To deny rights
to African Americans would only result in raising up those who would injure the
rights not only of blacks but of whites as well. Thus, as a delegate to the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1868, Corley advocated African American property ownership.
While a member of Congress, he spoke in favor of the ratification of the fifteenth
amendment to guarantee African American voting rights. He called for new ap-
proaches to public policy questions.7
The demise of Reconstruction did not mark the end of Corley’s participation
in politics. The election of 1880 proved to be critical at both the state and local
levels, especially in Lexington County. Corley attempted to inform national political
figures of the difficulties of South Carolina Republicans and also fought with both
white and African American Republicans against the entrenched power structure of
the Democratic party. In the summer of 1880 Corley made a concerted effort to
suggest the need of the national Republican Party’s direct intervention. Corley be-
lieved that after Hayes betrayed South Carolina Republicans by handing over the
state to Hampton, the result had been four years of despotism, which made Repub-
licans eager to “throw off the shackles by which they are illegally bound.” Corley also
felt that if Republicans failed in this campaign it would mean “our last hope for good
government is gone.” He therefore suggested to presidential nominee James Garfield
the importance of sending two or three good speakers who could campaign in each
county and encourage Republicans to surge to the polls. Corley’s suggestions evi-
dently attracted considerable discussion at the headquarters of the national party,
for William Chandler, who served as the defacto campaign manager for Garfield,
suggested that Corley’s ideas had merit. Yet Chandler concluded that there was an
insufficient amount of time to “arouse the whole state” and, as a result, Corley and
South Carolina Republicans were effectively on their own. Republicans did make a
massive effort to carry the state for Garfield but were stymied everywhere by mul-
tiple acts of fraud by Democratic election officials. Yet in the aftermath of the elec-
tion, Corley remained hopeful and sought to convince President-elect Garfield of
the necessity of using federal power to ensure “honest and fair elections.” Corley re-
mained committed then to the issues of civil rights, which he believed would help to
create a new kind of politics in South Carolina.8
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Such activity carried the price of being an object of both physical and legal
persecution by the Democrats. Democrats in the county suggested to Corley that he
ought to go by the jail and pick out his cell. Turning to the one lawyer who, he
believed, could influence a jury in Lexington County, one who would be able to
stand up to the “bulldozing influences which will be brought to bear upon it by the
political lawyers of the bar,” Corley wrote to beg the influence of Samuel Melton.
Few political alliances could seem more odd than that between Corley, the impas-
sioned tribune of the poor, and Melton, the suave, sophisticated attorney with ties to
the South Carolina aristocracy. What united these men was their politics, for in his
own quiet way Melton was just as committed to civil rights as was Corley. Melton was
a graduate of South Carolina College; he had developed a reputation as a gifted
attorney in the prewar years, was a state legislator, and thus was connected to the
political establishment in the state. When the secession crisis came, Melton, like
many moderates, accepted its reality. In fact, unlike Corley, Melton eagerly embraced
the Confederate cause and served as a colonel in the Confederate Army. Melton
evidently was a true believer, for as late as March 1865 he was writing his wife that the
suffering and pain of the South was a good thing in that it would make people “patri-
otic & true.” Yet Melton accepted the demise of the Confederacy with good grace
and, after passage of the Reconstruction Act, entered the Republican Party. In all
likelihood he did so not out of a commitment to equality but more as an act of
pragmatism.9
Through most of the Reconstruction period Melton preferred to remain in
the background. Melton was clearly a moderate Republican but still a party regular.
Melton was willing to publicly laud African American Congressman Robert Elliott
for a speech in support of the radical Civil Rights Act of 1875. Yet Melton came to
public recognition more for his close friendship with Daniel Chamberlain, who was
elected governor in 1874. Melton and Chamberlain were involved in the ownership
of the Daily Union Herald, a leading Republican newspaper, and formed a political
partnership that sought to reform the Republican Party. On such a platform Melton
was elected Attorney General of South Carolina in 1874 and remained a close ally of
Chamberlain for the next year. It was when Melton became convinced that Chamber-
lain was more interested in appeasing Democrats than reforming the party that he
ended his alliance with Chamberlain and eventually resigned as attorney general.10
Like the other Republicans discussed in this paper, Melton’s political career
did not dead end with the Democratic seizure of power in 1877; rather it took a new
form. In the immediate aftermath of redemption, Democrats began a concerted
program of persecution against the state Republican Party. They conducted count-
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less investigations and filed frivolous charges of bribery, misconduct, and fraud against
Republicans, hoping that the sheer volume of such suits could induce the federal
government to stop prosecuting Democrats who participated in election riots. As
one of the few Republicans Democrats would heed, Melton had to negotiate with
Democrats in an effort to stop their campaign of persecution. In fact, Melton be-
came a mediator between Governor Wade Hampton and President Rutherford B.
Hayes. It was a task that Melton found useful in that eventually he was able to move
Hampton to a compromise solution. Yet Melton evidently found absurd Hampton’s
contention that former Treasurer Francis Cardozo and Congressman Robert Smalls,
both African American politicians, were guilty of massive fraud. The prosecution of
Cardozo, Melton told Hayes, was “monstrous,” and he served as Cardozo’s attorney
at trial. Yet the eventual compromise, which involved an end to both state and fed-
eral prosecutions and the pardoning of Republicans convicted before Hampton’s
kangaroo courts, brought the issue to an end. Melton accepted the compromise
partly because he believed Hampton would allow fair elections in South Carolina
and might even serve Republican interests. Hampton, Melton told President Hayes,
was “desirous of having a strong and intelligent representation of our party in the
Legislature” and having conceded an “honest ballot and a fair count” it might once
more be possible to count “South Carolina for the Republic.” Melton’s estimate of
Hampton was overly optimistic, but in all likelihood Melton did much to end the
campaign of persecution.11
Melton remained an important figure in South Carolina politics throughout
the next decade. Serving as U.S. Attorney in the Garfield and Arthur administra-
tions Melton made real efforts to end violations of voting rights. Despite being well
aware of the difficulties of prosecuting election cases before juries of white Demo-
crats, he remained vigorous in his attempts to do so during his tenure as U.S. Attor-
ney. Almost alone in a fight with the whole apparatus of the Democratic party of the
state, Melton concluded, “this effort must be made.” He was aware that as an “unflinch-
ing Republican” his views were all but discounted before a jury. Yet the larger inter-
est of trying to secure the voting rights of African Americans and whites made that
effort worthwhile. The results were in many ways predictable; juries refused to con-
vict, but Melton’s determination reflected a willingness to try to secure the full mean-
ing of national citizenship for all people in South Carolina.12
An examination of the political careers of these four Republicans demonstrates
a clear pattern. All four remained consistent advocates of civil rights, especially of
voting rights, and while one can see necessity motivating some of their actions, cer-
tainly the intensity of their actions suggests that they came to their positions freely.
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Moreover, their advocacy of civil rights carried with it close association with African
Americans. This is not to suggest that these Republicans overcame all racial preju-
dice, but their party activity made them willing to extend full political rights to Afri-
can Americans. In their approach to political issues then, these scalawags fully accepted
the idea of civic equality and remained committed to full public participation. Op-
portunism simply cannot explain the depth of their political careers nor the degree
to which they remained involved in the issues of Reconstruction. Simeon Corley put
it best when articulating this new politics in 1868, “Old South Carolina, politically as
it was, is dead and buried with the past. New South Carolina, as it is, lives, and will
continue to live on the bright pages of history in the future, as a free, progressive
State of this great sisterhood, to the end of time.”13
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South Carolina Engineers
in the 42nd (Rainbow) Division
in World War I
David L. Snead
Despite witnessing the carnage in Europe for over two and a half years, the UnitedStates was not prepared for military involvement in the First World War when
President Woodrow Wilson sent his request for a declaration of war to Congress on 2
April 1917. Consequently, the army had to devise measures to expand its forces from
less than one hundred thirty-five thousand soldiers to several million as quickly as
possible. The army used new recruits, draftees procured through the 1917 Selective
Service Act, and the nation’s National Guard units. When the government federal-
ized the National Guard and placed it at the War Department’s disposal in July 1917,
each state knew it would have to play a role in supporting the war effort.
Secretary of War Newton Baker decided in early August to emphasize the im-
portance of a truly national effort and directed “that a division of the National Guard
composed of units which have the most efficient and best trained personnel, be
selected from various States and organized for immediate service in France.”1 His
objective was to create a division around which the country could rally.2 Ultimately
the 42nd, or as it was nicknamed, the Rainbow Division, comprised soldiers from
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia.3 The Palmetto state contributed the
1st Separate South Carolina Engineer Battalion to the 117th Engineer Regiment,
42nd Division.4 These engineers participated in most of the major American en-
gagements, won acclaim for their hard work and dedication to duty, and helped
make the allied victory possible.
Since the South Carolina battalion had served in Mexico in 1916, the War De-
partment saw these men as a source for engineers in the American Expeditionary Forces
(AEF). In May 1917 it asked Governor Richard Manning to organize engineering units
as quickly as possible.5 Manning immediately asked J. M. Johnson, chairman of the
State Highway Commission and commander of the 1st Battalion, to recruit soldiers to
fill his unit, Company A, and to create two new companies, B and C. Johnson quickly
filled Company A in Marion and established Companies B and C in Columbia and
Spartanburg, respectively.6 The companies trained at their home bases until mid-Au-
gust then came together at Camp Sevier in Greenville for two weeks of training.7
In late August the War Department named the three companies the 1st Battal-
ion, 117th Engineer Regiment, 42nd Division.8 Altogether 736 officers and men—
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about five hundred from South Carolina and the rest mainly from North Carolina
and Tennessee—were in the 1st Battalion when it traveled to Camp Alfred L. Mills
on Long Island to join the rest of the 42nd Division.9 Once in New York the 2nd
Battalion, containing primarily engineers from California, joined the 1st Battalion.10
The division trained at Camp Mills in the rudiments of being doughboys—the
nickname for the American soldiers—for six weeks before it sailed for Europe in mid-
October. Training began early each day with reveille at 5:30, breakfast, and drill be-
tween 7:30 and 11:30. The soldiers broke for lunch, resumed drill from 1:15 to 4:30,
and had dinner at 6:00. Taps was sounded at 9:45.11 Aside from extended practice
marches on Mondays and Fridays, the schedule remained the same for the entire six
weeks. In the first week soldiers had to march between five and six miles without packs.
By the end of the fourth week, they marched eight miles fully equipped.12 Beyond
marching, their training revolved around close order drills, instruction in their specific
areas of expertise—such as infantry, artillery, or engineering—and first aid.13
The division left Camp Mills on 18 October for its two-week voyage to France.14
Although the on-board schedule was not physically demanding, the soldiers often
stood in line for hours to get food, experienced repeated abandon ship drills, and
were allowed on deck usually only for an hour or less a day.15 To make matters worse,
the ships were dreadfully overcrowded.16 One soldier exclaimed, “Soldiers every-
where, no place to sit, no place to stand. A nice brisk walk? Impossible. . . . Oh for the
roominess of a sardine can.”17 Another doughboy remembered that the men were
“Crowded like horses into narrow bunks, with the plainest of food, in total darkness
at night, denied even the solace of a cigarette except by daylight, always having boat
drills—it was the Rainbow Division’s first test in stern discipline.”18
The fact that many men had never sailed on the ocean before compounded
the problem of overcrowding. After arriving in Europe one Rainbow officer recom-
mended that for future trips, “Suitable vomit cans or buckets should be placed in
sufficient numbers” to meet the needs of the men.19 The soldiers offered the ratio-
nale for this recommendation, as one recalled—“the floors were covered with the
vomit of troops who had yet to find their sea legs.”20 Another soldier “wished the
boat was any place but on the surface of the water.”21
Problems with food preparation made the seasickness worse. A sergeant re-
called, “in line for food it was so crowded you were lucky to get a meal every 24
hrs.!”22 The commander of an ambulance section in the division described the con-
ditions on-board ship as “nothing short of vile.” It is, he added
impossible for the men to even keep an outward appearance of
cleanliness. Beans last night were sour and this morning there
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was a resulting diarrhea. The seating capacity of the water closets
under normal conditions are so inadequate that men stand for
hours waiting to relieve themselves.23
Once in Europe, the AEF’s focus was on preparing the soldiers for combat.
But first it had to overcome the difficulties of transporting them to their training
areas. Ultimately, most traveled on the infamous French railroad cars, better known
as Hommes 40, Chevaux 8. One engineer wrote, “The boat was heaven compared to
the train.”24 The boxcars were designed to carry either 40 men or eight horses, but as
one soldier recalled, they were “crowded and uncomfortable as hell.”25 Another re-
membered that overcrowding and cold weather made it impossible to sleep,26 and
another that it was “so crowded we had to sleep spoon fashion—when one turned
over, all had to turn.”27
Once the division arrived at its destination in northeast France, the engineers’
primary task was to construct field fortifications, roads, and buildings.28 Ultimately,
however, they had to become adept in a variety of skills. From November 1917 to
mid-February 1918, they spent most of their time constructing hospitals, barracks,
bath houses, dugouts, latrines, mess halls, and target ranges.29 They also received
limited training in trench warfare, marksmanship, marches, and close order drill.30
The division moved into the trenches in the Luneville sector of the front in
mid-February and stayed there or in neighboring Baccarat for the next four months.
It trained with the French for about a month,31 but after the German spring offen-
sive began on 21 March, the French were withdrawn to meet the threat, and the
division was given control of the sector.32 While in the quiet sector, the engineers
practiced digging trenches and building and maintaining fortifications.33 The divi-
sion was responsible for about a seven-mile stretch, and the defenders strung barbed
wire entanglements in layers in front of the trenches, usually within fifty yards of
their own positions.34
Building and maintaining the defensive positions was endless, and while the
infantry faced risks, the engineers’ activities placed them in similar danger. Rou-
tinely, they built and maintained trenches, dugouts, roads, barracks, artillery and
machine gun positions, and observation posts.35 One engineer explained:
They built dugouts in record time, they directed the digging of
new trenches, and the repairs of old ones, they put in or repaired
barbed wire entanglements in No Man’s Land under the machine
gun menace of the enemy. They ran sawmills and repaired roads
under shell fire. They learned gas defense and how to dodge shells.
They built bridges and light railways and barracks.36
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This routine work occasionally became more dangerous. In the Baccarat sec-
tor the enemy commonly used artillery to shell the American trenches. Although
these attacks were made usually only to harass, they did create extra work and raise
anxieties because now the engineers had to make additional repairs under fire.37
One soldier wrote in March 1917, “I cannot describe the sound of a shell traveling
thru the air. It is a combination of a scream, a moan, a sigh and a screech.” He
added, “I thought I was going through hell on earth. Just waiting for a big shell to
put you out of your misery. Just at present I am a nervous wreck, after four days and
nights of bombarding, who wouldn’t be.”38 And the damage inflicted was often se-
vere. “Raids and artillery action,” one engineer wrote, “meant plenty of work for the
engineers. Caved in trenches, badly damaged dugouts and improper drainage gave
plenty to do during the day, leaving the night hours for the repairing of torn-up wire
entanglements that had suffered from enemy fire.” This additional work, however,
paled in comparison to the human toll. After one German barrage in March, engi-
neers frantically tried to dig out buried soldiers.39 What they found was sometimes
horrifying:
Two of the boys had carefully removed the first body. . . . Then
Harold Lorden and I got a litter ready, and we each grabbed hold of
a leg to drag out the second fellow. We pulled, but the leg in Lorden’s
hands was not fastened to the poor devil’s body, and Lorden went
sprawling over backwards, the leg hitting him squarely in the face.40
These types of casualties, although rare in a quiet sector, were an all-too-fre-
quent reminder of the realities of war. The 42nd Division experienced other types of
wartime realities by choice on other occasions. Numerous times during its stay in
Baccarat, units from the division launched raids against the German trenches. The
engineers provided valuable assistance for raiding parties. First, they made maps of
the areas targeted for raids. Second, they built practice trenches for training based
on aerial photography of the German lines.41 Finally, they often volunteered to go
on the raids to demolish targets in the German lines.42
Camden native Corporal Mannie Forte participated in a raid on 3 May. He
explained that the objectives of the raid
were to penetrate to his [the Germans’] third line about six or seven
hundred yards, kill everything we saw, blow up his dugouts, take his
machine guns and blow up their nests, and in other words demolish
everything.”43
Corporal George Browne captured the mood of the raiders:
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Our raiding party arrived in the front line at about 3:15 A.M. . . .  It
was a starlight morning but rather misty. As we entered the first line
there was practically no shelling but several machine guns in the
rear kept up a steady fire. After getting into position we still had
about a half hours wait as zero hour was 4 A.M At 3:45 A.M it com-
menced to get light a little and we all commenced to get a little cold
and nervous.
He then explained that once the artillery barrage started at 4:00 A.M., “it seemed
impossible that we had to go out in such a Hell as was in front of us. It seemed as if
the shells came from every direction at once as I think they did and thru all the pop-
popping of machine guns.”44
The artillery fire was devastatingly effective as the raiders found the German
trenches “completely destroyed. Its trenches were filled, all works above ground lev-
eled, wire entanglements torn down, and the forest itself turned into almost a bare
field.”45 Browne remembered coming “to the edge of woods again where we had
been taught the German front line was. I couldn’t for the life of me find any trace of
trenches. Nothing at all left of them. I have never seen such destruction before. The
largest trees even 18 inches in diameter broken off anywhere from the ground up.”46
In the end, the raid achieved the objective of destroying some German posi-
tions but failed in producing any prisoners. For the soldiers who experienced it,
however, it left them feeling like “veterans who had tasted the reality of war.”47
The engineers and rest of the division’s duties in Baccarat ended in June 1918
when they moved to the Champagne region of France to meet the last German
offensive of the war. Through a variety of intelligence gathering, the French had
learned the time and date of the attack. The French with American assistance devel-
oped an elastic defense strategy to meet the German threat. The idea was to absorb
the German attacks by establishing three lines of defense. French volunteers, who
were supposed to provide warning of the offensive and then slow the attackers,
manned the first line. Approximately a mile and a half behind this first line was the
main line of defense. The 42nd Division’s infantry regiments were placed here along-
side French soldiers. Reserve forces remained another half mile back.48 South
Carolina’s engineers and others were part of these reserves.49 After several days of
intense fighting, beginning on 15 July, the German attack quickly floundered in the
teeth of these defenses, and the 42nd Division was withdrawn from the front.
The division was then almost immediately ordered to participate in the Aisne-
Marne Offensive. On 25 July the engineers moved to a region near the Ourcq River to
prepare the way for the rest of the division.50 While the battle to cross the Ourcq was the
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42nd Division’s costliest in terms of casualties, it is also one of the least known.51 The
headline in the Charleston News and Courier on 30 July 1918 read, “River Ourcq Runs
Red with Blood Where Americans Triumph Over Prussian Guard.”52 South Carolina
engineers and the others in the 117th Engineer Regiment supplied part of that blood.
The engineers played a role in the division’s advance across the Ourcq. Their
principal missions were building and maintaining roads to the front and construct-
ing bridges over the river.53 They built two bridges over the river despite facing
snipers and machine gunners well hidden in the underbrush up
the slope, yet . . . [the Germans] were unable to break up the
daring work of the bridge builders, who daily faced snipers, ma-
chine guns and big shells in the execution of their work.54
Once the 42nd Division’s infantry pushed the Germans back, the engineers again
maintained the roads and bridges and waited anxiously as infantry reserves.55 On 1
August, Companies A and B, 117th Engineers, were given orders that they were to
act as infantry beginning the next morning.56 The engineers looked forward to the
attack because they wanted to show the rest of the division they were capable infan-
trymen.57 By the time they were relieved on 3 August, the engineers had advanced
further than any other unit in the division.58
The importance of the engineers at the Battle of the Ourcq cannot be over-
stated. As one colonel later explained, “They did their work as engineers in a man-
ner beyond criticism and we used them in the line as infantry. Yes, they lost some
men, but they were glad to be in the fight.”59 Praise even more glowing came from
Major General Clement Flagler, the future commander of the Rainbow Division. In
a citation to the 117th Engineer Regiment, he wrote:
The engineers were everywhere, in the advance, on the flanks, in
the rear. It was the engineers who made possible the retention of
the narrow strip along the north bank of the Ourcq. Time after
time the bridges over the Ourcq were shot away, and time after
time they were replaced by the engineers. And then when more
troops were needed to strike the final blow that broke the back-
bone of the German resistance, it was the engineers, hastily gath-
ered together from all over the divisional area, that struck it. They
dropped their tools, picked up their rifles and advanced to the
heights overlooking the Vesle [River], taking the town of Chery-
Chartreuve. They reached the farthest point of advance of any
dismounted elements of the Rainbow Division.60
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Unfortunately, the engineers’ duties near the Ourcq were not over on 3 Au-
gust. Besides the usual responsibilities of fixing roads, they had one other grueling
task—they had to police the battlefield.61 During its fighting in July and early August,
the 42nd Division experienced over five thousand casualties.62 As one soldier re-
corded in his diary, “Dead bodies were all around me . . . It sure brings war & all its
horrors home like nothing else could.”63 A Rainbow veteran writing at the time ex-
plained how, “the odor of dead things permeates the atmosphere everywhere.”64
One other doughboy wrote a particularly poignant letter: “One cannot believe the
misery a person is in when they walk around seeing bodies everywhere and then
realizing you may be one of them anytime.”65
After the engineers finished with these unpleasant duties, they rejoined the
division, and for the first time since arriving in France in November 1917, they had a
genuine rest period.66 It was fairly short, however, for by the end of August, they were
ordered to begin preparations for the first American offensive of the war at St. Mihiel.67
The objectives in this offensive were to collapse the St. Mihiel salient and cap-
ture or kill as many Germans as possible.68 The 42nd Division was assigned to the IV
Army Corps, First American Army, and given responsibility for a two-mile-wide sec-
tor of the front.69 The conditions at the front were extremely difficult. Father Francis
Duffy, the Rainbow Division chaplain, remembered that men “moved to the jump-
off point on the night of September 11th. The rain was falling in torrents. The roads
were like a swamp and the night was so dark that a man could not see the one in
front of him.”70 Another Rainbow veteran wrote:
For days the rain has been pouring down. . . . Water! Water! Wa-
ter! It runs, it trickles, it oozes from everything, everywhere. The
long column of infantry had been on the march for five black,
miserable nights, drenched to the skin, splashing, squashing its
way through the heavy liquid mud.”71
The diarist for the division’s Signal Platoon wrote, “It was a pitch-black night, with a
steady rain falling, and the mud was ankle deep. The roads were congested with
traffic, and progress was well-nigh impossible.”72
The muddy mess probably affected the engineers the most. There is no ques-
tion that everyone was wet and miserable, but the engineers were the ones respon-
sible for maintaining the inundated trenches, roads, and dugouts. One of the division’s
infantry recalled that the engineers “labored incessantly” to keep the roads in the
best shape possible.73 For the attack, the engineers were divided between the division’s
two infantry brigades—the 83rd and 84th—with most of those from South Carolina
working with the former.74 In the 117th Engineers “Companies A, B, D, and E had
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one platoon of wire cutters, each at work cutting chicanes in our own wire and guid-
ing the infantry to position, one platoon each assisting the tanks and two platoons
with accompanying artillery.”75
These engineering platoons guided the infantry, destroyed obstacles, and maintained
roads throughout the attack.76
The efforts of the engineers helped make the First American Army’s initial
offensive a success.77 With the salient reduced, the 42nd Division moved to partici-
pate in the greatest American attack of the war, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. While
its involvement in the attack on St. Mihiel precluded its participation in the opening
stages of the Meuse-Argonne, it soon joined the fray in early October.78
For most of the first half of October the division served as infantry reserves,
but on 12 October it moved to the front lines.79 This move was a particularly sober-
ing experience for all the men in the division, for the horrors of the previous weeks
of fighting on this battlefield were in evidence everywhere. One doughboy recalled:
Our route lay through the most devastated area I have ever seen,
forests and towns reduced to splinters and rubble, and mud, deep
mud, everywhere. . . . Any semblance to a woods had totally disap-
peared. It was a sea of mud and stumps.”80
A colonel wrote in his diary, “The desolation of the battlefield is beyond description.
Many dead Americans and Germans everywhere. Dead horses along every road. Ev-
ery building and tree destroyed and the ground one mass of muddy shell holes.”81
General John “Blackjack” Pershing, the commander of the AEF, ordered the
42nd and several other divisions to renew the offensive on 14 October against the
strongest position in the German lines. Father Duffy wrote:
It was a well prepared and strongly wired position consisting of
three lines of wires and trenches. The first rows of wire were breast
high and as much as twenty feet wide, all bound together in small
squares by iron supports so that it was almost impossible for artil-
lery to destroy it unless the whole ground was beaten flat.82
The engineers served as wire cutters, infantry reserves, and road builders in
the attack.83 They actually preceded the infantry in order to cut paths through the
layers of barbed wire. While they were successful in cutting the obstacles, “Bodies
littered the ground and corpses were hanging on the wire.”84 One infantryman ob-
serving the 117th’s activities remarked:
Some of our regular engineers tried to cut a passage through the
wire, covered by riflemen and several of our machine guns. But
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the Germans were firing from concealed pill boxes behind the
first belt of wires. . . . Their machine gun fire killed or wounded
all those engineers.85
Besides acting as wire cutters, the engineers had to maintain old roads and build
new ones. These tasks proved even more difficult as the American infantry advanced
because the newly conquered territory consisted of one shell hole after another.86
By the end of 16 October the attack had run its course, and the AEF entered a
two-week period of consolidating positions, rest, recovery, and retraining. The AEF
had suffered at all levels, and it needed this time before it could renew its offensive.87
The men were so exhausted that even minor aliments were debilitating.88 Every divi-
sion was short of soldiers. For example, the Rainbow Division needed an additional
7,600 men in late October to fill its ranks.89 Although not on the offensive, they still
suffered. Father Duffy later explained:
The two weeks that elapsed between October 16th and November
1st were the dreariest, draggiest days we spent in the war. The
men lay out on the bare hillsides in little pits they had dug for
themselves, the bottoms of which were turned into mud by fre-
quent rains. . . . They were dirty, lousy, thirsty; often hungry; and
nearly every last man was sick.90
On 1 November, the AEF renewed its offensive against the Germans with the
42nd Division in reserve.91 On 5 November, the division moved back to the front and
remained there until 9 November.92 The AEF, as a whole, had much more success in
these attacks than previously in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Yet the costs of the
offensive proved incredibly high. Over the course of forty-seven days of fighting, the
United States suffered 120,000 casualties, including over 4,200 in the Rainbow Divi-
sion and 91 in the 117th Engineers.93
After the 11 November armistice, the 42nd was one of several divisions assigned
temporary occupation duty in Germany. While the engineers engaged in some build-
ing projects, most of them, like the rest of the doughboys, simply wanted to go home.94
The division stayed in Germany until the middle of April 1919 when it set sail for New
York City. Once there, the 1st Battalion took a train to Columbia.95 In early May, the
engineers returned to their homes, and the 42nd Division took its place in history.
The 42nd Division and its engineers served in France longer than all but two
other American divisions and participated in the most important U.S. engagements.
While the Rainbow Division’s history has been told, very little has actually been writ-
ten about its engineers. Unfortunately, this is true of all the engineers in World War
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I; their story has never been told in the detail it needs and deserves. They served
with dedication, and, unfortunately, many paid the ultimate price. South Carolina’s
engineers provided valuable service to the American Expeditionary Forces by con-
structing trenches, building defensive fortifications, clearing paths for attacks, and
maintaining roads and bridges during allied operations. Without their commitment
and efforts, victory for the allies would have been much more difficult and costly.
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Surviving the Company of Men—in the Company of Women:
Lessons from the Corps of Cadets at Virginia Tech,
The Citadel, and the Virginia Military Institute
Marcia G. Synnott
Since beginning the research for this paper, my focus has broadened from thepersonal experiences of Shannon Faulkner (August 1995) and Nancy Ruth Mace
(1996–1999) in the Corps of Cadets at The Citadel, South Carolina’s state-supported
military college, to exploring existing models of a military education for women. It
should be emphasized that the admission of women to military schools is the result
of the changing perceptions of women’s competencies and potential contributions
to American society since World War II (in 1942, the first class of the Women’s Army
Corps received commissions at Fort Des Moines, Iowa).1 During the past sixty years,
all military schools have experienced profound sociological changes, even as they
clung to their revered traditions. On the one hand, by the 1970s, many of them
underwent transformation from being all-male and all-military to including women
and a large civilian student body—the land-grant and state-supported Virginia Poly-
technic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and the Texas Agricultural
and Mechanical (A&M) University, and the private Norwich University in Vermont
for example. On the other, there are the all-military schools that steadfastly fought
to remain all-male—the United States service academies, The Citadel, and the Vir-
ginia Military Institute. Although women have proven they can survive—and some
even triumph—in both models, a strong case can also be made that women cadets
have initially fared better in the less rigid institutional cultures of Virginia Tech,
Texas A&M, and Norwich University.
Single gender bonding has provided a viable model for women’s entry into mili-
tary life. Almost thirty years ago, in 1973, sophomore Cheryl Butler McDonald became
the first African American woman to join the Corps of Cadets at Virginia Tech. In her
November 1998 oral interview, she expressed gratitude for the experience, which, she
said “made me focus on my studies, made me focus on discipline and growing up and
being responsible.” She became “a stronger person” by developing “the mental tough-
ness” to deal “with different pressures” imposed by the Corps of Cadets. She also
accepted “more physical challenges” by joining the women’s track team.2
McDonald attributed the admission of women in 1973 to two reasons: first, the
corps was losing male members, and second, under the influence of “women’s lib and
all that good stuff,” the military was beginning to think of increasing the participation
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of women.3 Not only was the corps “a very small part of Virginia Tech” because most
students were civilians, but the influence of “women’s lib” allowed her to be an indi-
vidual and “to push the boundaries where I can do something that is non tradi-
tional.” Sex should not disqualify individuals from undertaking a task for which “they
are physically and mentally prepared for doing it, it doesn’t matter if they are male
or female, black or white.” From 1976 until her retirement in 1994, she worked in an
operational career field as an Air Force air weapons controller at a time when the
Army still assigned women administrative jobs.4
As the eldest of four children of a father who entered the Air Force as an
enlisted man and of a housewife mother, McDonald had attended integrated schools
on or near military bases. Although most of her family’s friends were black, she
“really didn’t experience racism in the military,” until she was later stationed in the
South. Supporting herself with a work-study scholarship, she initially did not think
of joining the military until persuaded by a white friend (who did not join) to take
the Air Force ROTC’s qualifying examination, on which she “scored fairly high.”
McDonald entered the corps as a sophomore together with three white women class-
mates and three juniors. Approving of her decision, her father was proud she be-
came “one of the first officers in the family—the entire extended family.”5 Her
housewife mother, whom she admired greatly, encouraged McDonald to pursue her
career choices.6
The first women cadets were treated as “rats” for only a day, an experience that
male freshmen had to endure for most of a year. McDonald saw the women cadets as
both pioneers and “specimens,” who “were kind of put under a microscope,” though
perhaps 30 percent came from military families. Assisted by a female advisor, the
women had few guidelines as to whether they were “to emphasize being feminine or
de-emphasize it.”They had to march in skirts and heels before they were allowed to
wear pants, “the most wonderful thing,” she said. Thus, the issues McDonald had to
deal with were developing an appropriate uniform, make-up, and hair style (the Air
Force allowed women’s hair length down to the collar edge or neatly worn up).
Having less demanding physical standards than the men, women had to run a mile
and a half to the men’s two miles. Some of the men “were really resentful of the fact
that we were in there” because they felt women were lowering the physical standards.
The women did not carry equipment or weapons. Nor were they permitted to carry
a senior saber or wear a senior cape.7
Given the responsibility of training the incoming freshman female cadets dur-
ing Cadre Week, the women sophomores and juniors in L Squadron, the women’s
unit for the U.S. Air Force, took their task very seriously, said McDonald. The upper-
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classmen had to put the freshmen through the “rat system,” during which they could
not “be their buddies.” But in contrast to the male model at The Citadel and VMI,
she emphasized: “We were not in the business of trying to make L Squadron mem-
bers quit. We wanted to keep as many girls as we could because we knew we were
small and we were trying to build something here and not tear it down.” McDonald
never got “pied,” a punishment usually reserved for the “most hated”; “Pie Day”
allowed the cadets to let off steam. Because they lived on the first floor of a single-
gender dormitory for civilian women and were isolated from male cadets, except for
eating in the same dining room, L Squadron soon became “closer than any squad-
ron or company in the Corps.” She appreciated the support her squadron received
from the professor of aerospace studies, the Air Force ROTC, Commandant George
Walsh, and the regimental staff. The Army ROTC seemed less open to having women.
Moreover, L Squadron won acceptance from the corps its first year, when it was ap-
plauded for marching with precision. For McDonald, “the first time that someone
was appreciative of us was really the turning point for me feeling accepted into the
Corps.” During her year as commander, the L Squadron won the Kohler Prize for
precision drilling, and it placed second or third for its piece on the Wizard of Oz in
the skit-night competition. In retrospect, however, McDonald felt that if Virginia
Tech and the Corps of Cadets “had more things planned out before we got there, I
think it would’ve helped a lot.”8
The “honor” of commanding L Squadron as a junior “was challenging,” occa-
sionally “frustrating,” but “fun at times,” though its demands led her to switch ma-
jors from time-consuming mathematics to more flexible art courses. Although L
Squadron was sometimes given too much advice by other squadrons on how to con-
duct itself, McDonald personally did not have a problem with other commanders,
who “recognized I had leadership.” “We were bound and determined that our male
counterparts were not going to find anything wrong with our freshman system,” she
said. Her greatest difficulty was internal—dealing with an executive officer the girls
disliked, who smoked heavily, was “very abrasive,” and gay.9 Wanting to make L Squad-
ron “look good,” McDonald strove to establish “a good atmosphere in the squadron,
and to treat people like people,” respecting differences as she dealt with complaints.
Her senior year, she was administrative officer and handled paperwork; she roomed
with the new commander, a junior.10
Because of the civil rights movement, McDonald felt gender was a more im-
portant issue than race, though race was occasionally raised with black male cadets.
She dated a black male cadet but did not feel “camaraderie” along racial lines.11 Nor
did she see herself as “a pioneer” until after she graduated as the first black female
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cadet.12 Of more importance to McDonald than being “the first black female in the
Corps” was being among the first women in the corps. “It was more I don’t want you
here because you’re female as opposed to you’re black,” she emphasized. Her mother,
who had dropped out of college when her own father became ill and then married
at eighteen or nineteen, “was really pleased that I went into the military because I
was doing something she wasn’t able to do back then cause her career choices were
even more limited than mine when I came out in 1976.”Neither race nor gender,
McDonald believed, should be barriers to her desire to follow a career and life not
traditional to a woman. Although occasionally treated as a racial minority by civil-
ians, the only segregation that McDonald saw in the military “was between officer
and enlisted not between black and white, or non-white and white.”13
When asked whether it would have been better if women had been integrated
into the male units in 1973, McDonald thought “it probably would’ve made the whole
process easier, the acceptance of us into the Corps a little easier,” but in “L Squadron
we got to form our identity and establish the fact that women really could be a legiti-
mate part of the Corps, and we got to do it our way.” Having won “the respect and
their trust,” it was “easier when the integration finally did happen when they put the
women into the individual units,” because immediate integration “could’ve failed
just like the women at VMI and the Citadel. . . . ” The first halfway integration oc-
curred when women living in the L Squadron area were assigned to the Highty
Tighties. Once that decision was made, McDonald thought these women should
have been allowed to participate fully in all Highty Tighties’ activities, so they would
feel they belonged to the unit, because cadets developed loyalty “to your buds, your
unit, and your Corps, kind of in that order.”14
McDonald felt it would be “a lot harder for a female” at The Citadel and Vir-
ginia Military Institute because they required all regular, daytime male students to
be in their Corps of Cadets and were so dedicated to their traditions of male bond-
ing. But they should also make allowances, she said, “for the individuality and the
fact that there are legitimate differences between males and females.” But when VMI
talked to Virginia Tech’s women cadets, then about 17 percent, “all they took was the
negative stuff. They didn’t take any of the positive stuff at all.” Both VMI and The
Citadel needed, observed McDonald, “to change the attitude of the leadership,” in
order to “change the attitude of the Corps.” It would take them some time, she
thought, to achieve the level of integrating women that had occurred at the military
service academies.15
The well-endowed Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (A&M) University fol-
lowed a path similar to Virginia Tech’s by admitting women to its corps ten years
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after first admitting them as civilian students. Membership in the Corps of Cadets
became voluntary for men in 1965. Initially assigned to their own units under male
leaders, the women in time developed their own leaders. Texas A&M’s 2000 cadets
today constitute “the largest uniformed body of students in the nation outside the
U.S. service academies.”16 Another military school pioneering a coeducational model
was the private Norwich University, originally chartered in 1819. It admitted women
to its Corps of Cadets in 1974, two years after merging with Vermont College, which
had educated women since 1834. Thus, Norwich University had established both a
coeducational and a non-military base, which presumably made it less difficult for
women seeking admission to its Corps of Cadets. Indeed, the training mandated for
its Corps of Cadets states: “While proper conduct, obedience to orders, and compli-
ance with Regulations are required, there is no activity that would subject a rook to
humiliation or indignity.”17
Under a congressional order, West Point, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapo-
lis, and the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado began admitting women in 1976.
Today, they graduate about six hundred women annually, many of whom have faced
and survived difficult gender battles. Of the 120 women admitted to West Point’s
class of 1980—about 8.5 percent—only about one-half graduated. “They did their
best to make as many of those women quit as they possibly could,” noted historian
Richard Atkinson; “for women it was a trial by double fire.” Lieutenant Colonel Carol
Barkalow, who had entered at seventeen, remembered: “Some days it was easy, other
days was as hard as hell.” Some days she wanted quit. As women cadets walked past
upperclassmen, it was common to hear in response to their “Good morning, sir,”
“Well, it was a good morning until you got here, bitch.” Barkalow said there were
“three groups of guys”: “guys who were actively against us”; “guys who really didn’t
care”; “and then we had our supporters, we had guys who truly came to our defense.”
Barkalow answered her personal question of whether she should be at West Point:
“You bet we should be here,” just as much as the men. Nevertheless, for four years,
the first women cadets felt very much like blacks did at segregated lunch counters.
“It was a very disheartening experience,” observed Mary Whitley, although it had
“many good things.” “I wouldn’t want to recommend being the first class of women
to go to West Point, because it was very difficult,” she said. “Graduation day from
West Point was the happiest day of my life. And it still is.”18
Such comments were no doubt also thought, if not spoken, by the first women
to enter the Corps of Cadets at The Citadel and at VMI. In light of the experiences the
first women had in other military schools, why did not The Citadel and VMI, which
did make some effort, really try to change the way they operated their initiation of
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entering freshmen? One wonders, even in 2001, how much intellectual and cultural
transformation has occurred at The Citadel since Shannon Faulkner reported on
campus, under the order of U.S. District Judge C. Weston Houck, on Saturday morn-
ing, 12 August 1995, along with almost six hundred freshman? Faulkner had attended
daytime classes at The Citadel under a January 1994 court order because there was
no comparable military training program for her anywhere in South Carolina. Re-
jecting the nascent alternative leadership program for women at Converse College,
the judge ruled that The Citadel had to obey the order of the U.S. Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals to admit Faulkner to its Corps of Cadets. Much to the resentment
of Citadel men, concessions were made to Faulkner: less strict guidelines on physical
conditioning; a short, but not a crew cut haircut; surveillance cameras monitoring
her single bedroom with a private bathroom in the Law Barracks; special security
locks on her door; and the monitoring of her reception on campus by federal mar-
shals. Faulkner did want to be reassigned to the same barracks used by members of
the band if she was accepted as a flutist.19
The two-and-one-half years of stress, combined with the high temperatures
and humidity, caught up with Faulkner on Friday, 18 August 1995. Outside the infir-
mary where she had spent Thursday night, she announced that she was withdrawing
from The Citadel, on what “has been the hardest day of my life.” Having missed
almost all of “hell week,” she knew she could never make up that experience, even if
she eventually passed the fitness tests. Faulkner did not see herself as “‘quitting’” but
rather as “‘taking a personal medical leave.’” There was no “dishonor in leaving. . . .
I think there is dis-justice in me staying and killing myself.’” She expressed the hope
that “‘next year, a whole group of women will be going in, . . . because maybe it
would have been different if those other women had been with me.’” Citadel presi-
dent General Claudius (“Bud”) E. Watts III was relieved because he felt “Faulkner’s
presence ‘posed a challenge for us’ and created a distraction.” When Faulkner’s
father and brother came to pick her up, male cadets celebrated by “Wa-hooing” and
venting the Rebel yell. A group of seventy-five upperclassmen in a circle did push-
ups in the rain to an indistinguishable chant. On the way to mess hall that evening
they chanted:
Marching down the avenue!
Now we know that Faulkner’s through!
I am happy and so are you!
Marching down the avenue!20
Like The Citadel (1842), the 157-year-old Virginia Military Institute in Lexing-
ton, the nation’s oldest state-supported military college (1839), had proudly been
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an all-male school since its founding. On 26 June 1996, in United States v. Virginia, 94
to 1941, the Supreme Court ruled seven to one, with Justice Antonin Scalia dissent-
ing (and Justice Clarence Thomas recused, since his son attended VMI), that state-
supported male-only education at VMI violated women applicants’ constitutional
rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for
the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal feminist, argued that women
should have equal access to the same educational opportunities as men unless an
“‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” existed. No women would be admitted to VMI
before the fall of 1997 since the class of 2000 was full, and it had no active applica-
tions from women. Unlike The Citadel, however, VMI would carefully prepare in a
technical sense for the admission of its first women, even developing an exchange
program with Norwich and Texas A & M.21
Two days after the Supreme Court ended male-only education at VMI, The
Citadel’s Board of Visitors unanimously voted to admit women to its Corps of Ca-
dets—after spending, together with the state of South Carolina, $3,240,000 trying to
keep them out. The Citadel made some plans for the admission of women but really
did not address ways of changing the hostile attitudes that many cadets and alumni
felt toward it. Although The Citadel followed the Justice Department’s suggestion to
bring in students from coeducational military schools on an exchange program, it
had recruited only two cadets from Norwich and Texas A &M. In August 1996, four
women enrolled in The Citadel’s 1900-man corps: Nancy Ruth Mace, Kim Messer, Petra
Lovetinska, and Jeanie Mentavlos. Messer proved to be a difficult and sloppy room-
mate for Mace; and Lovetinska would have preferred to room with Mace rather than
Mentavlos. Moreover, as knobs, the four soon faced not only the usual “racking” by
upperclassmen but also problems such as serious hazing, even sexual harassment. On
her way to the library one evening in mid-November 1996, Mace was told by a menac-
ing upperclassman: “‘You-are-a-piece of shit! Leave-my-school!’” For Mace, however,
“failure would be a kind of death, the death of every hope I had for self-respect.” She
set her “face in stone” and “would never look back.” Mace found comfort in prayer, her
family, and a few decent male cadets. In mid-December, however, the corps experi-
enced “the biggest scandal since Shannon Faulkner had left The Citadel.”22
Charging that male cadets set her sweat shirt on fire, punished her more harshly
than other knobs, and made sexual comments, Jeanie Mentavlos moved off campus
with Kim Messer. Mace was interrogated about what she knew and given, as was
Lovetinska, a cellular phone; both had “panic buttons” put in their rooms to call
guards, if needed. Mentavlos and Messer resigned in January 1997 and then initi-
ated lawsuits. In March, The Citadel punished nine male cadets and expelled one
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for hazing and harassment; that August, The Citadel announced that there would be
“Zero Tolerance for Hazing.” Messer settled her sexual harassment lawsuit against
The Citadel for $33,750 in 1998. In November 1999, The Citadel settled Mentavlos’s
sexual harassment suit for $100,000 and no admission of liability against it and Cap-
tain Richard Ellis, a former ROTC instructor at the school. Mentavlos, who argued
that The Citadel “conspired with five male cadets to keep her from getting a military
education equal to that of male cadets” by treating her “worse than male cadets
because the school did not want women in the corps of cadets,” also settled with two
of the five she charged with harassment.23
Volunteering to serve on committees as a way of helping The Citadel “improve
the Assimilation Plan for Women,” Mace dealt with issues such as uniforms, sexual
harassment, and menstruation. She gained “a sense of power, of control, that helped
me get through the hard times in the battalion,” and saw it as a way of helping in-
coming women cadets. Mace completed her challenging year as a knob after endur-
ing the grueling exercising, running and drilling of Recognition Day in late May
1998. But being welcomed as a cadet by upperclassmen did not end her sense of
isolation. Indeed, she acknowledged that during her second year she “felt more alone
than ever,” though she became cadet sergeant the second semester. She subsequently
rose to academic officer for Band Company. Even the Ring Ceremony in October
1998, when she received her senior class ring a year ahead of others who entered in
1996 because of courses taken at Trident Tech, made her “a nervous wreck.” She
feared being booed. Indeed, she was hissed by the parents of other cadets, who,
when ordered to remain silent, “glared.” Yet despite “all the pain and bigotry I had
suffered,” she wrote, “I would not have traded that ring, or my three years in the
Corps, for anything in the world.” When, on 8 May 1999, retired Brigadier General
James Emory Mace, Jr.,1963, The Citadel’s most decorated living alumnus, presented
his daughter her bachelor of science degree in business administration, magna cum
laude, Nancy Mace became the first woman cadet to graduate, joining 368 male
cadets. But had The Citadel really changed its views on women cadets by then? To be
sure, significant changes occurred during her father’s term as Commandant of Ca-
dets, which began in late February 1998, including the improved discipline and the
admission of more women. Moreover, his daughter could take satisfaction that she
“had proven” herself “in a man’s world” and “had done it without giving up my
womanhood.” On 19 May 1999, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a reso-
lution commending Mace as “the prototype of the Citadel woman” because of “her
leadership, exemplary conduct, and outstanding achievements while a cadet at The
Citadel.”24
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Attitudes still need to change more profoundly at The Citadel because women
are still resented for not conforming to male standards and for weakening male
bonding. Indeed, alumni were and are among those least accepting of the women.
For example, some Citadel and VMI alumni, organized by VMI alumnus Mike Guthrie,
began to raise money for a private male military college. The Southern Military
Institute “would be an ‘overtly politically incorrect institution,’ a Christian college
that would emphasize military traditions of the Confederacy.” Ultimately, it failed to
attract sufficient funding to open a viable alternative to either VMI or The Citadel.25
Meanwhile, the best protection for women cadets is a steady increase in their
numbers, so they can look out for each other. In the fall of 1997, The Citadel admit-
ted 20 women, 17 of whom survived their freshman year, including Mandy Garcia,
the first woman to win an athletic scholarship. In November 1997, the Association of
Citadel Men renamed itself The Citadel Alumni Association. According to The
Citadel’s enrollment statistics by gender, the number of women in the corps of Ca-
dets has continued to rise: fall 1998, 34 female freshmen out of 534; 13 female sopho-
mores out of 376; and 2 juniors out of 384. By spring 1998 there were 28 female and
451 male freshmen still enrolled. The corresponding figures for the fall of 1999
were: 32 female (out of 41 admitted) and 550 male freshmen; 25 female and 393
male sophomores; 11 female and 371 male juniors; and 1 female and 369 male se-
niors. By the spring of 2000 there were 26 female and 496 male freshmen; 24 female
and 394 male sophomores; 11 female and 363 male juniors; and 1 female and 329
male seniors. In the fall of 2000 there were 26 female and 568 male freshmen; 20
female and 426 male sophomores; 23 females and 361 male juniors; and 10 female
and 364 male seniors. By the spring of 2001 there were 25 female and 532 male
freshmen; 23 female and 442 male sophomores; 23 female and 364 male juniors;
and 10 female and 326 male seniors. Finally, by fall 2001, The Citadel enrolled in the
Corps of Cadets 33 female and 583 male freshmen; 21 female and 463 male sopho-
mores; 21 female and 416 male juniors; and 23 female and 374 male seniors. Tabu-
lating total female enrollment in the Corps of Cadets from fall 1996 to fall 2001, it
rose from 4 (0.2 percent) in 1996; to 20 (1.2 percent) in 1997; to 49 (2.9 percent) in
1998; to 69 (3.9 percent) in 1999; to 79 (4.4 percent) in 2000; and to 98 (5.1 per-
cent) in 2001. In the U.S. military services adacemies’ first year of coeducation, the
percentage of women enrolled ranged from 8.5 percent at West Point, to 7 percent
at the U.S. Naval Academy, and 11 percent at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Today,
those percentages range from 15 to 18 percent. Virginia Tech’s Corps of Cadets is 17
percent female; and Norwich University is about 15 percent. The highest percent-
age of women—30 percent—is to be found in the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.26
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According to Laura Fairchild Brodie, author of Breaking Out: VMI and the Com-
ing of Women (2000), “events at The Citadel provided a cautionary tale.” Because The
Citadel was skewered by Ed Bradley in a Sixty Minutes probe, VMI worked hard to
dispel from the public mind the inevitable linking of the two military colleges.27 On
the one hand, “Citadel graduates tend to credit their school with being more rigor-
ous, militarily and academically, than VMI, while Institute cadets counter that what
passes for rigor at The Citadel is in fact a culture of sadism, where ritualistic hazing is
ingrained in daily life.” The citizens of both states, Brodie conceded, thought they
were more civilized in behavior. Because of its small size, VMI included some sixteen
hundred people in its orientation sessions.28
The state of Virginia had provided a “start-up budget” of $5,200,000 to VMI
compared with the less than one million provided by South Carolina to The Citadel,
which evidently needed little money for construction.29 VMI’s Orientation Commit-
tee focused on four issues: “fraternization, hazing, new assimilation policies, and,
above all else, sexual harassment.” Because of the Tailhook scandal and charges of
sexual harassment at Aberdeen Proving Ground and at The Citadel, VMI addressed
that potential problem but resisted the concept of “‘sensitivity training.’” At the be-
ginning of each orientation session, VMI’s superintendent, Major General Josiah
Bunting III, ordered the showing of excerpts from the Sixty Minutes show on The
Citadel.30 “With its orientation sessions,” said Brodie, “VMI hoped to encourage ca-
dets to question behaviors that they had long taken for granted, and to envision the
standards of conduct that ideally should prevail at a military college.” During this
period, the Department of Justice followed closely what VMI was doing to admit
women and make them welcome. Some of the press, however, including an edito-
rial, “Taking VMI Prisoner,” in the Wall Street Journal (3 June 1997), thought the
Justice Department went too far in making demands for detailed information.31
Implementing a nine to eight vote of its Board of Visitors, VMI admitted 66
women, out of 91 female applicants, and 786 men to the class of 2001. Thirty women,
17 on partial or full academic scholarships, and 427 men, 38 of whom received simi-
lar scholarships, matriculated in August 1997. None of the women admitted were
either alumni daughters or granddaughters although about one-third had a military
parent or family member. VMI used scholarships to recruit two women from New
Mexico Military Institute, a junior college founded by a VMI graduate: Melissa Gra-
ham (class of 1999) and Mia Utz (class of 2001) came as transfer students with U.S.
Army Reserve commissions. When Graham, who saw herself “first and foremost” as
“a member of the Corps and proud to be so,” and Chih-Yuan Ho, from the Republic
of China, who wanted “to be remembered as a VMI graduate period not as a woman
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who graduated from VMI,” became the first two female graduates in May 1999, some
of their 223 male classmates felt they “had not paid their dues.” Nevertheless, VMI
had found “a few good women,” as Brodie observed, “women who could acclimate
themselves to a method of education specifically designed for men.”32
In addition to relying on the “dyke system,” under which first class cadets served
as mentors to help women make it through the ratline, VMI invited eight women
and two men as exchange students from Texas A&M and Norwich universities. But
some VMI first classmen resented any interference from the exchange students, be-
coming possessive about the female rats: “‘These are our women. Keep away.’” In-
deed, VMI cadets boasted “that their Barracks was more spartan, their Honor Code
more stringent, and their ratline more brutal than anything faced at Norwich or
A&M.” At least one A&M student felt she played useful role as a “lightning rod” for
the anger of VMI’s male cadets at the decision to admit women: “‘Id rather them
abuse me, make rumors about me, and pin me down for things I didn’t do or say,
than taking it out on the girls. That goes back to the whole reason that I am here. I
wish somebody had done that for my school.’” VMI’s female rats, however, did not
always appreciate their presence. Indeed, by the fall semester’s end, said Brodie, “it
was VMI’s women, not its men, who had become especially antagonistic toward the
exchange students—criticizing them, snubbing them, refusing to call them ma’am.”
Some felt that the exchange program was unnecessary, believing that VMI “could
handle coeducation without help.” Others, unaware that the exchange students had
been told by VMI’s upperclassmen not to interfere, “felt personally insulted when
they saw the women from Norwich and A&M keeping their distance.” But VMI’s
female rats were also jealous of the exchange students’ freedom to look feminine
and to make friends with the upperclass cadets. “‘Those are our first classmen,’ one
female rat insisted, complaining about the flirtatiousness of a few exchange students.”
On other hand, VMI cadets who went as exchange students to Texas A&M and Nor-
wich universities “were being treated like royalty,” while their visitors were denied
the privilege of marching with bayonets fixed during weekly parades at VMI.33
Brodie emphasized that women cadets would find it difficult to maintain “a
sense of feminine identity in a predominantly male world.” To become “a female
Brother Rat” took personal “sacrifices.” The future of women at VMI would be deter-
mined after seven months on the ratline, which ended after “Resurrection,” their
final week of physical and mental challenges. Rats completed a fifteen-mile mid-
night march and then crawled and climbed up muddy “Breakout Hill,” on 16 March
1998. Those accepted as cadets included 361 of the 430 men who had matriculated
in August 1997 and 23 of the 30 women. Astute observers realized, moreover, that
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VMI’s first female rats, as upperclassmen, would be as tough as the male upperclass-
men on incoming rats. According to Brodie, “it would be easier for the Institute to
produce a female rat than to create a ‘VMI Woman.’” Because “the ratline was designed
to downplay gender differences, along with differences in class and ethnicity,” it aimed
to mold “the rats into one predominantly masculine group.” After the ratline ended,
“the distinctions between men and women would emerge more clearly.”34
Female sophomores, however, could no longer count on the “dyke system” for
“big brothers to fight the women’s battles.” VMI administrators were cautioned by those
from other military colleges that “crises were more likely to come in subsequent years,
as VMI became complacent and as its women became less tolerant of the daily struggle
for respect in a masculine culture.” The sophomore women could only hope that “con-
scientious male peers” would continue “to speak out when they saw problems arise.”
Otherwise, they would be quite alone.35 In 2001, two years after the first two women
graduated, VMI’s first truly coeducational class received its diplomas. One of its out-
standing women was Erin Claunch, daughter of an Air Force pilot, who chose to attend
VMI on a full four-year scholarship instead of the U.S. Air Force Academy. On 15 Feb-
ruary 2001, the Virginia General Assembly presented Senate Joint Resolution 412 to
Claunch, a physics major and Cadet 2nd battalion commander, and to Charles Bunting,
class president and a son of VMI Superintendent Bunting.36
After enrolling only 28 women in the fall of 1999, VMI began to attract signifi-
cantly more inquiries from women—4,463 out of a total of 19,315 for the class of 2005.
In the fall of 2001, VMI admitted 79 out of the 100 female applicants and 780 out of
1,313 male applicants. It anticipated that 415 would matriculate, in keeping with the
Board of Visitors’ decision to limit the “Rat” class to about 400 to ameliorate over-
crowded barrack conditions and to enroll students with higher SATs (a mean score of
1125).37 Not until 8 December 2001, however, about seven months after VMI had gradu-
ated its first truly coeducational class, did the lawsuit initiated by the federal govern-
ment in 1990 end. In accepting the joint dismissal motion filed by both the U.S. Justice
Department and state Attorney General’s Office, Judge Jackson Kiser of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia agreed that “the Commonwealth parties
have met their obligation under the Remand Order ‘to formulate, adopt, and imple-
ment a plan that conforms with the Equal Protection Clause’ of the United States Con-
stitution.” Superintendent Bunting felt that “the VMI family” had been vindicated in its
program to assimilate women, “without compromising the Institute’s core values.”38
Meanwhile, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary
Baldwin College seemed to offer to some women a more supportive alternative to
VMI. VWIL, still state-supported though no longer receiving funding from VMI, had
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graduated 22 women in 1999, 24 in 2000, and 25 in 2001. After two years of imple-
menting VMI’s “transition to coeducation,” Colonel N. Michael Bissell, a 1961 VMI
graduate and decorated combat pilot in Vietnam, had returned full-time to VWIL as
its commandant. “After their school’s long struggle to remain all-male,” observed
Brodie, “the legacy of VMI’s legal battle seemed to be that Virginia would offer single-
sex military education to its daughters, but not its sons.” Mary Baldwin’s short-lived
counterpart at Converse College no longer had support from the State of South
Carolina or from The Citadel, but it still prepares “women to be strong leaders in
their professions and in their communities.”39
If a lesson emerges from this survey it is that all models for a military educa-
tion for women have their flaws, largely because women’s inclusion in military insti-
tutions and units is relatively so new that the inherent gender conflicts have yet to be
satisfactorily resolved. Even twenty-six years after the admission of women to Texas
A&M’s Corps of Cadets, one woman exchange student acknowledged while at VMI
that “‘our problems are far from being solved.’” On the other hand, evidence sug-
gests that, in military colleges as in traditional colleges, women’s separate space can
be a positive experience as a transitional measure into full coeducation. Both histori-
cally separate women’s colleges and historically black colleges and universities have
trained more female and black professionals, respectively, than either coeducational
colleges or historically white colleges that admitted African Americans.40
Nevertheless, military women progressed within the army since the
disestablishment of the Women’s Army Corps on 2 October 1978. According to Joshua
S. Goldstein’s War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (2001),
“the Gulf War was a big victory for liberal feminism,” with close to forty thousand
women constituting 6 percent of U.S. forces. They “participated in large numbers,
and performed capably, and the public proved willing to accept women soldiers as
casualties and POWs.” The Army treats women just as “soldiers,” neither attempting
“to avoid assigning one or two women alone to a unit of several hundred soldiers,”
nor training “male soldiers effectively to work with women better.” Moreover, “mili-
tary studies” show “that men and women work together well when women are not a
novelty in a unit.” But as women enter positions previously closed to them, they
again become “a novelty,” which occurs in “each entering class at the academies, and
in basic training.” For both men and women, as their “unit works together, however,
and especially if it deploys in the field, unit bonding appears to overcome gender
divisions to a great extent.” The key seems to be implementing what it will take for
men to stop seeing military women as “novelties” who have gone AWOL from their
traditional sphere.41
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director, she traveled to its concerts and attended numerous VMI functions. With the permission
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aggressiveness’” (Goldstein, 100; Dana Priest, “Engendering a Warrior Spirit,” Washington Post, 3
March 1997). As of 1998, the military services restricted women from one in six jobs (http://
www.feminist.org/ 911/sexharnews_military.html).
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 A Notice to Contributors Concerning Style
The editorial committee invites submission of manuscripts from authors of pa-pers presented at the annual meeting. On the recommendation of reviewers
and editors, manuscripts may be published in The Proceedings of the South Carolina
Historical Association.
In general, manuscripts should not exceed 4500 words, about eighteen pages
(double-spaced) including endnotes. As soon as possible after the annual meeting,
authors should submit two paper copies and one electronic copy to the editor for
review.  The electronic copy must be submitted on a PC-compatible diskette written
in MS Word 6.0+ for Windows or WordPerfect 5.2+ for Windows. The electronic text
should be flush left, unformatted, single spaced, and saved as “text only.” Paginate
your paper, double space the text, and indent the first word of a new paragraph only
on the paper copy. All copies should use 12 point type in the Times New Roman
font. Do not include a title page, but instead place your title and name at the top of
the first page. Please use margins of one inch throughout your paper and space only
once between sentences. Indent five spaces without quotation marks all quotations
five or more lines in length.
Documentation should be provided in endnotes, not at the foot of each page.
At the end of the text of your paper double-space, then type the word “endnote”
centered between the margins. List endnotes in Arabic numerical sequence, each
number followed by a period and space, and then the text of the endnote. Endnotes
should be flush left and lines single-spaced. If your word-processing program de-
mands the raised footnote numeral, it will be acceptable. Foreign words and titles of
books or journals should be italicized. For the rest, The Proceedings of the South Caro-
lina Historical Association adheres in matters of general usage to the fourteenth edi-
tion of The Chicago Manual of Style.
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Minutes of the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting of the SCHA
2 March 2002
The South Carolina Historical Association held its seventy-second annual meet-ing in the Stern Center, College of Charleston, Charleston SC, on 2 March 2002.
Registration ran from 8:30 until 10:00 A.M. in the Stern Center Ballroom.
Session 1: (9.30–10:45 A.M.).)
A. Fighting for Democracy. Lee Baker, “One Man One Vote: The Impact of Electoral
Reform during the French Revolution on Local Elections;” David L. Snead, “S.C.
Engineers in the 42nd (Rainbow) Division in World War I.” Chair: Bill Brockington
B. Literary Remains: Poetry and Journals
Michael Auterson, “Gaining a White Hearing: Legitimization Strategies in Selected
Poems of Phillis Wheatley;” Matthew H. Jennings, “My Brave Yamassees, John
Barnwell’s Journal and the First Tuscarora Expedition; ” Stephen Kenny, “John Marion
Sims and the Story of His Life. ”Chair: Michael Morris
C. The World Is Not As It Seems
Henry A. Sandberg, “Mid-Victorian Representations of Bacchus: Alcoholic Ecstasy
and Passivity;” John P. Barrington, “Suppressing the Great Awakening: Alexander
Garden’s Use of Anti-Popery Against George Whitefield. ” Chair: Linda Hayner
Morning coffee break was held from 10:45 until 11:00
Session 2: (11:00 A.M.–12:15 P.M.)
A. Carolina Universities
Marcia G. Synnott, “Surviving the Company of Men—in the Company of Women: Les-
sons from the Corps of Cadets at Virginia Tech and the Citadel;” Dan Ruff, “Legendary
Leader at the Citadel, 1936-1960: A. G. D. Wiles;” Jackie R. Booker, “Aggressive
Methodism and the Founding of Claflin University, 1869–1894.” Chair: Katherine
Grenier
B. Carolina Power
Kari Frederickson, “Creating the Savannah River Plant in the 1950s;” T. Robert Hart,
“Archibald Rutledge and the Santee-Cooper Project.” Chair: Jim Farmer
C. Scalawags
Lewie Reece, “Righteous Lives: A Comparative Study of the South Carolina Scalawag
Leadership During Reconstruction;” Hyman Rubin, “Race, Reconstruction politics,
and the South Carolina Scalawags;” Thomas L. Powers, “Race and Place in the
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Construction of a Confederate Memory: Richard McIlwaine’s Memories of Three-
score Years and Ten. ” Chair: Ken Peters
Luncheon and business meeting (12:30–2:15 P.M.)
At 1:05 P.M., following lunch in the Stern Center ballroom, the meeting was called to
order by SCHA President Calvin Smith.
Calvin thanked the College of Charleston for its support in hosting our annual
meeting, with particular thanks to Amy McCandless, who did a wonderful job with
handling the local arrangements. He also thanked the presenters and all who were
in attendance, noting that their enthusiasm keeps us an active and important aspect
of the profession in SC.
6Officers’ reports
Secretary —Ron Cox thanked the members for submitting tidbits of information for
publication in the Newsletter and asked them to “keep them coming.”
Treasurer—Rodger Stroup placed copies of the financial report on each table. He
asked members to share as a part of the association’s frugality program. He dis-
cussed the format of the report. The general fund includes two savings accounts and
a checking account, while the others are self-explanatory. We’re down a couple of
thousand dollars from last year. The cost of printing the PROCEEDINGS has gone
up, and last year’s meeting cost more than we anticipated. However, our estimations
have worked perfectly this year, and we appear to be right on target.
Proceedings—Steve Lowe thanked those from last year’s meeting who submitted pa-
pers and noted that the latest issue of Proceedings is available today. He further urged
presenters to submit papers for consideration in next year’s issue.
New business
The Executive Board moved to increase membership dues, from $10 to $15 for regu-
lar members but to keep student dues at $5. Offered from committee, the motion
required no second. The chair asked for discussion; there was none, and the mem-
bership approved the motion.
Announcements
The SCHA 2003 Meeting will be held at the SC Department of Archives & History in
Columbia.
Keynote address
Calvin Smith then introduced Dr. Dan Carter, who spoke on “Returning to South
Carolina.” Dr Carter reflected on his early years in the Palmetto State, discussing the
connections between personal history and textbook history.
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 He also noted the role of the historian as a teacher, explaining that we all are
looking for a way to try to connect history to our students’ lives and experiences.




The Nominating Committee offered the following slate of officers for the 2002–
2003 year:
President – Linda Hayner
Vice President – Tracy Power
Secretary – Ron Cox
Treasurer – Rodger Stroup
Robin Copp — At large
Sam Thomas — At large
Bernard Powers — At large
Steve Lowe – Editor of Proceedings
With no additional nominations from the floor, the membership accepted the slate
by acclamation.
Prize committees
Calvin Smith also noted that we need two prize committees for coming year — one
to judge graduate papers, and another to judge papers submitted by regular mem-
ber/non-student members. Anyone interested in volunteering should contact Calvin
Smith or Linda Hayner.
[Calvin turned the podium over to Linda Hayner, who recognized Tracy Power as
the one who will arrange work for next year’s meeting. Tracy has lots of new ideas for
next year’s meeting.]
Additional announcements
• The SE Women’s session has been moved from Palmetto Room to Jessamine Room.
• Amy McCandless gave directions to the Avery Research Center for those who are
parked in parking garage.
• Rodger Stroup announced that Senator Byrd put money in this year’s budget for
teaching American history—$953,000 over three years. The Archives will administer
the money. Walter Edgar and Rodger pulled together a group, who thought the
focus should be elementary and secondary teachers and ways they can teach history
better. The first teaching program will be this summer and is just being advertised. The
number of applications is a little disappointing. There is also a five-week position for
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“Master Scholar” to help staff with content. Lectures in Charleston, Columbia, and
Greenville areas will carry a $12000 stipend for summer plus travel—great opportu-
nity; please keep this in mind.
Archives & History Hours—with tightness of state budget we have stretched our-
selves to keep different areas open; budget cut currently proposed in House is 6
percent on top of a 15 percent cut already made. Effective in April, reference room
will be closed nights and weekends. We will lose 17 percent of staff by the time these
cuts occur, but we have no choice. So, just to let you know for your own planning
purposes, we will be open only during regular state business hours, and this will
probably hold true for the next six to eight months.
• Tracy Power discussed his preliminary plans for next year’s annual meeting. We
are hoping to to generate more papers and are particularly interested in getting
people to see SCHA as an association in South Carolina, not only of South Carolina.
We will also seek to encourage more participation by European and non-Western
historians and scholars.
The meeting was declared adjourned at 2:10 P.M.
Session 3: 2:30–3:30 P.M.
A. Southeastern Women: Ethnicity, Gender and Politics (Panel)
Michael Morris, “Southeastern Indian Women: Gender Role Myths and Realities;”
Lee Ann Caldwell, “Troublesome Women in Early Colonial Georgia: 1733–1752;”
W. Scott Poole, “The Beauty and Harmony of the Picture: Southern Womanhood, the
Lost Cause and the Aesthetic Construction of Ideology in South Carolina, 1866–1879.”
Chair: Amy McCandless
B. Carolina Laborers
Fritz Hamer, “From Cracked to Perfect Bottles: Laurens Glass Works: 1910–1986;”
Tara M. Mielnik, “The Civilian Conservation Corps in South Carolina; ” Jonathan D.
Gentry, “The Congress on Industrial Organizations’ “Operation Dixie” in South
Carolina’s Textile Industry: Lessons in Union Opposition, 1946-1951.” Chair: Ron Cox
Reception and tour of Avery Research Center (3:45–4:30)
